

STORY OF 1 PARACHUTE BRIGADE.OUTLINE GROUND PLAN.1. TASK.

The task of 1 Para Bde was to seize the main Rhine Br at ARNHEM and to hold it until the arrival of the remainder of 1 Airborne Div expected in the afternoon or evening of D + 1. The Bde would then continue to hold the inner perimeter of the bridge with one Bn as Div reserve. Relief by 30 Corps was expected any time after 24 hrs. In the event of the main bridge being blown, the Bde was to seize the Rly Br intact.

2. TROOPS.

1 Para Bde with under comd -

1 Para Sqn R.E.

16 Para Fd Amb.

1 Airlanding A/Tk Bty (12 6-prs and 4 17 prs).

Sec Pro.

Pl.R.A.S.C.

1 Airlanding Recce Sqn (less one Tp.

In Support -

3 Air Landing Lt Bty (8 75 m.m.)

3. PLAN.

D.Z. and L.Z. NORTH of HEELSUM.

Time of landing. Gliders 1330 hrs.

Paratps 1350 - 1410 hrs.

In general terms the plan was for 2 Para Bn to capture the Bridge moving by HEELSUM and thence along the rd running close to the North bank of the RHINE. This Bn then to hold the South end of the Br and the NORTH end facing WEST and N.W. 3 Para Bn to move at the same time by the main HEELSUM-ARNHEM Rd and to assist 2 Para Bn by approaching the Br from the NORTH, then to hold the NORTH end of the Br facing N.E. and EAST. 1 Para Bn to move on orders of Bde H.Q., when it was clear that 2 and 3 Para Bns were satisfactorily launched, and to occupy the high ground just NORTH of ARNHEM to deny the enemy observation of the inner defensive perimeter and to control the approaches to the town from NORTH and N.W. from APELDOORN and EDE. This Bn to retain One coy in Bde res about 753793. Each Bn had under comd -

One Tp A/Tk guns.

Tp or Det R.E.

Sec. Fd Amb.

Two F.O.Os.

Bde H.Q. and remaining attached troops to follow 2 Para Bn.

16 Para Fd Amb to set up D.S. at ELIZABETH HOSP 727779.

1 Airlanding Recce Sqn less one tp was to land first and attempt a "coup de main" against the Bridge.

2 Para Bn route to be called 'LYON'.

3 Para Bn route to be called 'TIGER'.

Rd EDE - ARNHEM to be called 'LEOPARD'.

1 Para Bn to move N.E. from D.Z. over Rly and then follow LEOPARD to edge of town.

continued sheet No.2.

1 Air Landing Bde would remain to protect DZ & LZ area for 2nd lift on D + 1 and would deny approaches from WEST between LION and LEOPARD.

STORY OF WHAT HAPPENED.

4. The flight was excellent. No flak until just before the drop which was perfect; dead accurate both for time and place.

5. R.V. arrangements worked satisfactorily and coloured smokes showed up well. Bns were in touch with Bde H.Q. by wireless and L.O. within $\frac{1}{2}$ hr. Bns were about 100 per cent strength except for a few 3" mortars and P.I.A.Ts. O.C.A./Tk Bty reported 11 out of 12 6-prs. I do not know how many 17-prs arrived but the majority of Bren carriers landed safely. There was no opposition on D.Z. or L.Z. but 2 Bn ambushed a number of German vehicles at HEELSUM - their R.V. - and took about 20 prisoners. Dutch contacted on D.Z. said that there were very few Germans in ARNHEM. 2 and 3 Bns moved off soon after 1500 hours by which time they had their A/Tk guns and most of their tpt. Slight delay in arrival of Bde H.Q. tpt. In view of satisfactory drop and reports, I ordered 1 Bn to move about 1530 hrs. My wireless Jeep arrived about then and I moved off via 'LION' with my I.O. - Capt. Taylor, telling B.M. to follow along with Bde H.Q. directly tpt arrived. Before moving I heard that Recce Sqn had lost most of their tpt. This meant that they could not carry out "coup de main" task and I ordered 2 and 3 Bns to move with all speed and, if necessary or possible, not to hesitate to send one Coy forward in Jeeps in view of probable light opposition.

6. About 1600 hrs I met C.O. 2 Bn about 666770. His leading Coy 'A' - Major Tatham-Warter - was in contact about 673772. I told C.O. to by-pass opposition to avoid delay. He said he thought it could be cleared easily.

7. Owing to reports of enemy in woods between LION and TIGER I returned via HEELSUM thence along TIGER. There were a number of destroyed German cars on both routes and several dead Germans.

8. I contacted C.O. 3 Para Bn about 683785 at about 1630 hrs. His leading Coy was also in contact just EAST of that point - B Coy, Major Waddy.

The Bn was rather strung out as the heavy weapons could not keep up. Soon after I arrived two arm'd cars caused some trouble coming in from a side rd and knocking out two jeeps. The 6 Pr could not get into action quick enough. The ground was excellent for delaying, with thick woods, well ridged, and solid houses.

9. I decided to wait and watch events here and soon after my B.M. came up on the set and said the G.O.C. was not satisfied with the speed of our progress. I, myself, was determined that we should not be delayed by minor opposition on the roads; I had already spoken to C.O. 2 Bn and now did so to C.O. 3 Bn in person and to Adj't 1 Bn on wireless. I learned from Adj't 1 Bn that they were in contact with enemy forces estimated a Bn with four tanks about 675820 where their tanks had just reached LEOPARD.

10. Communications with 1 Para Bn were bad and from this time I had practically no more information from them. In fact, their leading Coy 'R' - Major Timothy - had run into very stiff opposition about this point and had suffered about 50 per cent casualties. The remainder of the Bn had by-passed moving South and parallel to 'LEOPARD' and by 1900 hrs had reached Rd junc 690809. They were about to push North on to LEOPARD when 5 tanks and 15 half-track vehicles passed x-rd 691811 moving West, while infantry were located digging in Wood 694809.

11. It was obvious that the enemy were now in the process of occupying the high ground astride LEOPARD in strength and Lt. Col. Dobie sent back for R Coy before bypassing to SOUTH again. As 'R' Coy did not appear

and were out of wireless touch, the 2 i/c was sent back while the Bn occupied a posn of all-round defence.

12. From now till 2200 hrs, spasmodic fighting went on and at that time 2 i/c returned to say that R Coy had 50 percent casualties and could not get them out. The C.O. sent all available tpt to help and 2 i/c was ordered to bring R Coy along. At 0100 hrs R Coy still had not arrived and we will leave 1 Para Bn for the moment.

13. Meanwhile about 1730 hrs with 3 Para Bn, I had decided to return to my H.Q. when the enemy opened automatic fire on the road from the woods about BILDERBERG 679785. C Coy - Major Lewis - were just moving up with orders to by-pass the enemy frontal opposition to the NORTH, moving to the railway and thence back to the main TIGER route further EAST. The enemy appeared to be withdrawing in front of 'B' Coy while the rest of the Bn closed up to about 682737.

14. The enemy were still firing on a portion of the road about here from the NORTH and 'A' Coy - who had arrived about 1800 hrs, were ordered to send a patrol to investigate the tick country just NORTH of the rd. About this time, the Div Comd appeared in a jeep and was shot at at the same point. He said he was expecting Major Gough and part of the Recce Sqn to move up that rd and it was decided we should both wait till he arrived. The enemy was still troublesome from NORTH of rd and eventually about 1830 hrs Major Dennison took two Pls of 'A' Coy to deal with the opposition.

15. About 1800 hrs the enemy brought some heavy and most accurate mortar fire on the remains of 3 Para Bn in this area 680785. There were a number of casualties and I decided to move this party - consisting of 'A' Coy less two pls, Tp R.E. and part of H.Q. Coy - out of this area and close up on the rest of the Bn who had moved East down the road. At the same time Major Dennison and his two pls were ordered to rejoin us. It was obvious that the enemy had an O.P. in the house or trees near the road and shortly after we left the area, very heavy mortar and Nebelwerfer fire came down. We closed up on Bn HQ $\frac{1}{2}$ mile down the road. Among the casualties were Capt. Theisiger 2 i/c A Coy and the G.O.C.'s driver and operator.

16. It was now about 1930 hrs and dusk. I decided with the C.O. that the Bn less C Coy should take up an all-round defensive position where they were about 690784. C Coy to do the same wherever they were. The G.O.C. was not in touch with Div H.Q. but I spoke to the B.M. on my set and told him that the Div Comd and myself would remain with 3 Bn for the night. He told me that 2 Bn were progressing well and had reached the Rly Br 707765. Their route - "LION" appeared to be the best approach to the Bridge. Both of us were out of touch with 1 Bn, last heard of about 691811. I ordered Bde H.Q. to follow on after 2 Para Bn.

17. At last light on D. Day I was not worried about the situation. The enemy had certainly reacted quickly and were holding the two main rds from the WEST. TIGER and LEOPARD, but 2 Bn were now making good progress after overcoming early opposition. Owing to bad communications with 1 Bn I had not got a true picture of the scale of opposition confronting them.

18. Soon after dark, Major Dennison returned with two platoons of A Coy; they had encountered a strong enemy position of about one bn in the area of the BILDERBERG. Before receiving orders to withdraw they had overrun three M.G. posts killing about 9 Germans and taking 20 prisoners. They had had about 20 wounded themselves. 3 Bn

casualties now amounted to 4 killed and 35 wounded - several seriously. The serious cases required immediate evacuation but, as patrols sent out later in the night found enemy both East and West of us on TIGER, it was impossible to evacuate them either back to 1 Air Landing Bde D.S. at WOLFHEZEN or forward to the ELIZABETH HOSP 726779 where the Bde D.S. was established. This latter was, incidentally, confirmed by the Bn M.O. Capt. Rutherford, who telephoned the hospital on the civil line. All casualties had, therefore, to be kept.

19. From now onwards, for the rest of the night, wireless ceased to function. The 2 i/c Major Bush was sent to contact 'C' Coy, this he was unable to do, though he found a number of dead Germans and burnt and burning German ammunition lorries in their wake just short of the railway. In fact this coy moved via the railway to the Bridge where it came under command 2 Para Bn.

20. About 2130 hrs, just before wireless finally failed, information came from the B.M. that 2 Bn were on the main Br which was intact.

21. The C.O. and I agreed during the night and as a result of patrolling, to disengage the Bn before first light and move South through OOSTERBEEK and thence via 'LION' to the bridge.

22. Meanwhile 2 Para Bn followed by Bde H.Q. and some attached tps including 16 Fd Amb, had progressed well. The initial opposition had soon been outflanked. An armoured car had caused some delay and casualties from the railway onwards. C Coy moved South to the Rly Br, but it was blown before they could cross. The C.O. expected opposition from DEN BRINK 7173 which overlooked the road and B Coy were ordered to occupy it - this they did in face of considerable opposition and after suffering casualties.

23. 'A' Coy were able to move South of this feature and entered the town keeping close to the river. Small parties of enemy were quickly dealt with and about 40 prisoners taken. About 2000 hrs they arrived at the North end of the Br to find enemy tpt crossing from South North. At 2045 an assault to seize the South end by One Pl of 'A' Coy - Lieut. Grayburn - was launched, but had to be abandoned in face of fire from a flak gun in a pillbox on the Br and from an armd car.

24. Meanwhile, wireless comn between Bn HQ and 'B' & 'C' Coys had broken down and the North end of the Br was consolidated by 'A' Coy, Bn H.Q. Coy & Bde H.Q.

25. A patrol was dispatched to contact 'B' Coy who had been ordered to the Pontoon Br 738775 to order them to cross the river by barge and seize the South end of the Br. No contact was made and R.E. recce revealed the fact that there were no barges. Actually, B Coy - less one platoon lost - arrived about 0500 hrs D + 1 having met strong resistance at the Pontoon Br and suffered casualties.

26. During the night also, about one half 'C' Coy 3 Bn arrived. It is not clear what happened to the rest of the Coy, but it is believed that the leading platoon were ambushed whilst approaching the bridge from the North in the dark.

27. The situation with 2 Para Bn at first light D + 1 was that they were holding the North end of the bridge with a mixed force of approximately Para Bn strength and including one of their 6-pr A/Tk guns. They were finally established in the strong buildings round the bridge and had already repulsed a determined German counter-attack from the South of the bridge.

28. At 0430 D + 1 3 Para Bn was successfully disengaged and moved S.E. through OOSTERBEEK to route 'LION'. Considerable firing was heard to the North and N.W. but no resistance was encountered until after crossing the railway where there was some sniping from the South. Finally 'B' Coy leading reached a point about 300 yards West of ELIZABETH Hospital 729779 before coming under fire from the A.A. positions South of the river and an armoured car on the road.

29. At this point - about 0630 hrs - the unwelcome discovery was made that the Bn had become split in half and that 'A' Coy, H.Q. Coy and all the transport including three out of four A/Tk guns and the G.O.C's. and my own wireless jeeps, were not following. The reason for this serious mistake was that the move had begun in pitch darkness and that the C.O. had led the Bn very fast and by a somewhat circuitous route. His Bn staff were very blameworthy that this occurred as I had personally sent several message forward during the move to find out whether my jeep was following.

30. There was no wireless touch with the straying Coys and an effort was made to push on. The A.A. fire was, to a certain extent, neutralized by 3" mortar and L.M.G. fire, though the only 6 Pr was lost by a direct hit from a 88 m.m. Flak gun. 'B' Coy infiltrated forward and by about 0930 hrs reported contact with some men from 2 Bn about 400 yards East of ELIZABETH Hospital. This was probably their lost Coy - 'C' Coy. My I.O. had, with the aid of a friendly Dutchman, spoken to the Div F.S.O. on the bridge. He reported it held by one Coy of 2 Para Bn but was vague as to how much of 2 Bn was there. Soon afterwards, an enemy counter-attack was reported coming from the town and consisting of infantry with one or two tanks. As a result of this, 'B' Coy was concentrated and the Bn, consisting of Bn H.Q., 'B' Coy, Tp R.E. occupied some strong houses each side of the main rd just West of ELIZABETH Hosp. Here we will leave them for the moment and return to 1 Para Bn.

31. At 0100 hrs D + 1, since 'R' Coy had not arrived, guides were left and the Bn moved South with the object of reaching their objective via the town; they had heard that the bridge was in our hands, but had no comms to Ede H.Q. Going through the woods was very difficult with A/Tk guns and transport. An enemy post at X tracks about 697797 was driven out with casualties and at 0430 hrs, the Bn reached Rd junc 709783 and the leading Coy 'S' - Major Stark - encountered strong enemy resistance from astride the road 713782. It will be remembered that at this time, 3 Para Bn was moving South from this same rd - route 'TIGER' - only about 1½ miles to the West.

32. Enemy resistance included armoured cars, M.Gs, 20 m.m. and mortars, 'S' Coy attacked round left flank and gained Northern part of enemy positions, inflicting casualties. 'S' Coy had 30 casualties.

33. At 0530 hrs, the C.O. received information through his F.O.O. that 2 Bn was in urgent need of reinforcements. He decided to disengage and to by-pass via South and so to Bridge.

34. At 0700 hrs, 1 Para Bn picked up H.Q. Coy, 3 Para Bn which, it will be remembered, had become separated together with 'A' Coy from 3 Para Bn. Soon afterwards the Bn ran into mortar and shell fire about Rly Fr 712775. The enemy were in strength astride the road at Houses 712226, in Factory 720774, and area Rly Fr 715780. Four armd cars and one tank were seen at this Br but moved to high ground 718778 which was strongly held. It would appear from this that the enemy, having initially blocked the two main rds. TIGER and LEOPARD and inadvertently allowed 2 Bn and part of 3 Bn to get into the town, had now closed the last gap just after 3 Bn had passed and were holding in strength DEN BRINK and the houses and factory covering the route

LION to the South of it. Possibly the occupation of DEN BRINK by 'B' Coy 2 Bn on the previous evening had caused the enemy to withdraw from it and allow 3 Bn to slip through.

35. At 0830 hrs, 1 Bn less 'R' Coy and most of H.Q. Coy which was with 'R' Coy, plus H.Q. Coy 3 Bn, were held up by strong enemy resistance on the line of the rly. The Bn had been moving and fighting almost continuously for 15 hours and 'S' Coy had about 30 per cent casualties - here we will leave them and return to 2 Bn on the Bridge.

36. At first light, Major Murray - O.C. 1 Para Sqn R.E. - did a careful recce of the bridge and found that it was not prepared for demolition. During the morning, armd cars attempted to cross from the South, but ten armd cars and half tracks were destroyed by 6 prs and P.I.A.Ts. Throughout this and succeeding days, the 'Bn position was heavily and continuously mortared, with little effect on the strongly built houses. There was also a good deal of light flak from South of the river.

37. During the afternoon and evening a strong attack developed along the river bank from the EAST. This attack was held until dark and two tanks were destroyed, one by 6-pr and one by P.I.A.T. Just before dark the Germans burnt down four of the houses, Bde HQ only narrowly escaping a 'martyrs pyre'.

38. By last light on D+1, it was reported that 1 and 3 Bns could not get through, but there were reports in the evening that 11 Bn and S S.Staffs were on their way.

39. During the night some adjustments were made to the position and the Eastern flank strengthened. Another counter-attack from the SOUTH was repulsed and Major Wallis 2 i/c was killed.

40. We will return to 3 Para Bn just West of ELIZABETH Hosp. The expected counter-attack developed about 0900 hrs and from then until about 1600 hrs the Bn was attacked at frequent intervals by infantry supported by mortars and a Mk IV tank and armd car. The attacks were not pressed home and casualties were light. Mortaring was ineffective except that Major Waddy - OC 'B' Coy - was killed in the open. The Mk IV Tank narrowly escaped destruction from Gammon bombs and, from then onwards, kept its distance.

41. Information received through the F.O.O. showed what was happening on the bridge and that they were receiving artillery support. It was obvious that, although they were holding their own, they would soon need more ammunition. 3 Bn F.O.O. was not in wireless comn with Control and could get no artillery support throughout.

42. Wireless communication to 'A' Coy was very bad but the Coy was understood to be just EAST of the rly - or a mile to our EAST - about 0900 hrs.

43. I would emphasise here that I still saw no cause for alarm in the situation. The Bridge was ours. The opposition ahead of us did not seem serious and we were only waiting for the rest of the Bn when we would be strong enough to continue the advance. No news had been received from 1 Bn since the night before and I felt that they would soon begin to influence the situation in our favour.

continued sheet No.7.

44. As the morning wore on, I began to get rather worried and impatient at the delay and strenuous efforts were made to regain touch with 'A' Coy. This was done about 1230 hrs and it was discovered that they were not across the railway but, together with two Coys of 1 Bn, were staging an attack on the area DEN BRINK and South of it at 1315 hrs. It will be recalled that 1 Bn less 'R' Coy were held up by strong opposition in this area about 0530 hrs, but this was the first information I had received of it and it came as something of a shock to find that the enemy was so strong just West of us. Lt.Col.Fitch emphasised to Major Dennison - OC 'A' Coy - that it was vital he should reach us as he had with him two carrier loads of reserve ammunition badly needed at the bridge. We now awaited with impatience the arrival of this force and I made a tentative plan with Lt.Col.Fitch for our further advance to the bridge.

45. At 1430 hrs the remnants of 'A' Coy and the Bn Defence Platoon arrived under Lt.Burwash. They totalled no more than 30 - 40 men with only one officer. They had suffered considerable casualties in breaking through a very strong enemy position and Major Dennison had been badly wounded. About 10 men from 1 Bn also arrived. They had become separated from the Bn. I could get no coherent information as to what had happened to the rest of 1 Para Bn, except that they had had very heavy casualties.

46. It was decided to push on as soon as more ammunition could be distributed. The main road was under heavy fire so I agreed with Lt. Col. Fitch that we should move North through the gardens and houses till we struck the railway and then try that approach. Meanwhile we had just heard from a Dutch Liaison Officer who had arrived from Div H.Q. in a carrier that the 2nd lift was not landing till 1500 hrs. The G.O.C.was able to get a message through to Div H.Q. on this officers set. He had put up a very fine effort in reaching us at all and had made an unsuccessful effort to get ammunition to the bridge. He said he would renew the attempt after dark.

47. We moved off at about 1600 hrs - our total strength must have been about 130 - 140 all ranks. Progress was slow and difficult owing to high walls between the gardens. There was some sniping and we were very bunched and vulnerable. There was a long delay after crossing the street parallel to LION/TIGER and half way between it and the railway. Here I decided with the G.O.C. and my I.O.to take a short cut by the ELIZABETH Hospital. I was wounded and had to be left in a cellar in a small house about 100 yards West of the hospital.

48. 3 Bn were unable to make any progress and the Bn came under heavy mortar and MG fire from the railway embankment North and N.W. of the hospital. Before it got dark they again took up a defensive position in the houses little more than 300 yards North of where we had fought all that day. Here we will leave them and return to 1 Para Bn.

49. At 0900 hours T Coy 1 Para Bn - Major Perrin-Brown - put in a most determined attack astride 'LION' and gained the houses at 717776. The attack was supported by Lt arty and 3 Para Bn Mortars and M.M.Gs.which had arrived with their H.Q.Coy. A further attack on the factory on the right of the road at 720774 failed largely owing to 20 m.m.fire from flak positions on the river bank.

50. Meanwhile, 'A' Coy 3 Bn - Major Dennison - had arrived and Lt. Col. Dobie planned another co-ordinated attack. 'A' Coy 3 Bn was to seize the high ground North of the rd - DEN BRINK - and 'T' Coy was to attack astride the road on to the factory. The attack was supported by 3 Bn mortars & M.M.Gs.and the Lt Artillery.

Lt.Col.Thompson (C.O.Lt Regt) was there throughout and he and the F.O.O.gave excellent support. This was the attack of which I had been informed and went in about 1400 hours. It was successful and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. A 6 pr was used to destroy a pillbox in the Factory area, and an armd car was destroyed. Meanwhile 'S' Coy 1 Bn were attacked from the rear. They held this and received 6 minor casualties. Fighting had been extremely bitter and 'T' Coy who had carried out three attacks since 0800 hrs were reduced to 22 men.

51. About 1300 hrs 1 En reached just West of rd junc 726778 and came under heavy fire from 88 m.m., M.G. and mortars from directly ahead. The rd junc was gained after a short battle supported by 3" mortar fire. 1 En must therefore have arrived 100 yards West of 3 En positions just as the latter were forming up to move off to the North and it was a pity that no contact was made.

52. 1 En continued to advance East down the South side of the main rd but could not get past rd junc 728779 owing to tanks. In fact, as 3 En moved off, 1 En came up against the same resistance that had held 3 En. At this point, mortar, Lt Arty and MMGs destroyed or neutralised two more A.A.guns on the South bank of the river.

53. About 1700 hours the En crossed the rd under cover of smoke and tried the North side moving by the gardens of the houses just vacated by 3 En. They came under heavy fire just West of ELIZABETH Hospital and it was impossible to get any vehicles forward. Here they were held and there is no doubt that this advance of 1 En astride the main rd, allowed 3 En to disengage with so little difficulty and so few casualties

54. At 1830 hours D + 1 Lt.Col.Dobie received a message from the bridge - presumably from B.M. or Lt.Col.Frost - that he must get through. He had left only about 100 men and any further advance by daylight was out of the question.

55. At 2000 hrs, the S Staffs arrived bringing with them 'R' Coy 1 En and the portion of H.Q.Coy which had been with 'R' Coy. 'R' Coy had about 40 men. A plan was made between the two C.Os. for a further advance on the bridge starting at 2100 hrs. More ammunition was issued.

56. Information then came that bridge had been over-run and the attack was put off.

57. At 2300 hrs 1 En F.O.O.heard 2 En F.O.O.on br calling for fire. Lt.Col.Dobie therefore decided to get to bridge and sent a runner to Div.H.Q.to say this. About that time 11 En arrived and Lt.Col.Lea, the C.O.was brought into the plan.

58. At 0100 hrs D + 2, orders were received to withdraw to ~~OCSTERBEEK~~.

59. At 0230 hrs D + 2, these orders were cancelled and Lt.Col.Dobie made a fresh plan. 1 En to advance on RIGHT by river bank. S.Staffs LEFT by main rd with HQ Coy and tpt of 1 Bn. 11 En to follow 1 En axis. Start time 0330 hrs. S.Staffs were 1/2 hr late.

60. 1 En crossed start line about 0400 hrs and reached the rd at river bank about 730779 just beyond ELIZABETH Hospital. Here, Capt. Dorrien-Smith, 3 En, met the C.O.and warned him that the bank was impossible owing to heavy opposition.

61. The advance continued and at 0430 hrs very heavy opposition was encountered - mortars, shelling and M.G.fire.

Also enemy armour and half tracks on high ground to the left. Heavy casualties were inflicted on enemy infantry with bayonet and grenades and the way was cleared as far as rd junc 739778 just beyond Pontoon bridge. Remainder of enemy infantry ran or surrendered.

62. At 0500, 1 Bn was attacked by tanks, from the town just above them. These kept on coming to the edge and firing and dropping grenades down the bank. 'R' Coy retaliated with Gammon bombs. Opposition ahead was growing more intense. A number of German prisoners were accompanying the Bn.

63. By 0600 hrs the position was becoming desperate. The S.Staffs on the left flank appeared to have withdrawn and, as a result, the Bn was infiladed and overlooked from the river front. Tanks were engaging them at point blank range. At this time the C.O. made his last check up on numbers which were -

R Coy.	6 men.
S Coy.	15 men.
T Coy.	8 men.
Bn H.Q.	10 men.

H.Q. Coy was moving with S.Staffs.

Wireless communication had gone but a final effort was made to get into buildings on the high ground. At about 0630 hrs the C.O. was wounded and it is probable that the survivors were overrun by 0700 hrs D + 2 day. Nothing is known of 11 Para Bn who were not seen again. It is possible that they were attacked from the rear whilst moving behind 1 Bn.

64. 3 Para Bn had a very similar experience on the early morning of D + 2. The Bn had no difficulty in maintaining its position in the houses N.W. of ELIZABETH Hospital during the night. Capt. Dorrien-Smith took out a patrol during the night to try the river bank. It was probably on his way back from this patrol that he met Lt.Col. Dobie, C.O. 1 Bn. In any case, Lt.Col. Fitch decided to attempt this way and he followed on the heels of 1 Para Bn. They suffered a similar fate. Lt.Col. Fitch himself was killed and there were three of the few remaining officers wounded in ELIZABETH Hospital.

65. We now return to 2 Para Bn on the bridge. It is certain that the gallant though fruitless efforts of 1 and 3 Bns to reach the bridge drew off much of the enemy opposition and, inflicting as it did, heavy casualties, allowed the defenders of the bridge a little more breathing space.

66. German attacks from the East were resumed early on D + 2 and continued throughout the morning. About mid-day, three tanks got into positions near the river and shelled one of the key houses just East of the bridge. The house had to be evacuated, but Capt. Frank - Comd 'A' Coy - took two PIATs and scored three hits on the tanks, driving them and two more away. Lt. McDermott's platoon of 'A' Coy then counter-attacked the house and re-occupied it, although Lt. McDermott was mortally wounded.

67. A heavy gun South of the river now caused serious trouble, demolishing the top storeys of two houses just West of the bridge and causing 'B' Coy some casualties. Two armd cars, also from the West penetrated along the river bank but one was destroyed with a PIAT by major Murray R.E. and the other withdrew.

68. Pressure continued until dark and some more burning houses had to be evacuated. A Tiger or Panther tank caused much trouble by running down our line of houses and putting a shell into each. Major Tatham-Warter - acting C.O. 2 Bn - was injured by blast and Major Gough took over command of 2 Bn temporarily. The 6 pr positions were now under intense small arms fire and could not be manned. Capt. Frank - OC 'A' Coy - had also been wounded and Capt. Hoyer-Miller took his place.

69. The position had now deteriorated. Many houses had been burnt down and casualties had reached alarming proportions. These were in the cellar of Ede H.Q. where Capt. Logan - M.O. 2 Para Bn - and Capt. Wright - M.O. Ede H.Q. did magnificent work.
70. On D + 3 day, pressure from the East continued all morning. A party of Ede Sigs and RASC under the Staff Captain - Captain Briggs - who had been attacked incessantly, were burnt out of the houses one by one and gradually the troops holding the East perimeter were forced out and finally beyond the end of the bridge. Ammunition was getting short and it must be remembered that no supplies of any sort had reached the Bn.
71. Lt. Col. Frost - OC Force - and Major Crawley - OC 'B' Coy - were both wounded during the day. Major Gough took over command, referring matters of importance to Lt. Col. Frost. Major Tate took over 2 Bn but Major Tatham-Warter was able to resume command later.
72. The remnants of the force were now holding 6 houses just to the N.W. and commanding the end of the bridge. Alternative positions had been dug in the gardens anticipating the firing of the houses. During the afternoon, 4 or 5 German tanks were able to cross the bridge from the North as the 6 positions could no longer be manned. News also arrived that 30 Corps would attack the South end of the bridge at 1700 hrs and Bn were confident of holding out for one more day.
73. An 88 m.m. gun was then brought up to close range and shelled the remaining houses. It was silenced for a time by 3" mortar fire but resumed just before dark and then three important houses of the last 6 were set on fire by phosphorous bombs. Ede H.Q. caught on fire and no sooner were the wounded now numbering about 280, moved to another house, than that too caught fire.
74. The order was now given to surrender the wounded. The enemy got them out of the building in time, but took advantage of the confused situation to infiltrate into the gardens.
75. The force was now split into several parties and had to withdraw from the gardens of the burning houses. An attempt to re-occupy them early on the morning of D + 4 was not successful and organized resistance was at its end. The survivors, probably numbering about 100 - 150 attempted to make their way back through the town to rejoin the Div, but were probably nearly all rounded up.
76. The men fought magnificently, particularly 'A' Coy and Ede Sigs & RASC party under Capt. Briggs.
77. No mention has been made of 16 Para Fd Amb which set up in ELIZABETH Hospital on the evening of D day. Later that night, the Germans re-occupied that area and, despite every protest, insisted on taking prisoners and marching off the whole party except the Surgical teams. It was only by the firmness and tact shown by Major Longsland that these teams were not also taken, leaving the wounded unattended. Continuous operating by the two surgeons forestalled several attempts by the Germans to do this.
78. It is understood that about 150 all ranks of the Brigade fought under Major Lonsdale, comd survivors of 11 Para Bn for 6 days with the rest of the Div OOSTERBEEK. This party was mostly 1 and 3 Para Bns.
79. So ended a very gallant and bitter struggle. Officers and men fought magnificently against superior numbers of first-class S.S. Troops well supplied with tanks and S.P. guns. The ARNHEM Br was captured and held for over three days and that was their task.