## Copies of important letters and messages.

- 1. Letter from Field Marshal Montgomery. -
- 2. Letter from Lieut.-General Dempsey.
- 3. Letter from Lieut.-General Browning.
- 4. Letter from Lieut.-General Horrocks.
- 5. Letter to 64th Medium Regiment, R.A.
- 6. Signal from 6 Airborne Div.
- 7. Copy of 2nd Fara Bn pigeon message.
- 8. Signal from Major-General Urquhart to Lieut.-General Browning.

TAC. HEADQUARTERS, 21 ARMY GROUP, 28 September 1944.

Major-Gen. R. E. Urquhart, Comd. 1 Airborne Division.

1. I want to express to you personally, and to evry officer and man in your Division, my appreciation of what you all did at ARNHEM for the Allied cause.

I also want to express to you my own admiration, and the admiration of us all in 21 Army Group, for the magnificent fighting spirit that your Division displayed in battle against great odds on the North Bank of the Lower Rhine in Holland.

2. There is no shadow of doubt that, had you failed, operations elsewhere would have been gravely compromised. You did not fail, and all is well elsewhere.

I would like all Britain to know that in your final message from the ARNHEM area you said:

"All will be ordered to break out rather than surrender. We have attempted our best, and we will continue to do our best as long as possible."

And all Britain will say to you:

" You did your best; you all did your duty; and we are proud of you!

3. In the Annals of the British Army there are many glorious deeds. In our Army we have always drawn great strength and inspiration from past traditions, and endeavoured to live up to the high standards of those who have gone before.

But there can be few episodes more glorious than the epic of ARNHEM, and those that follow after will find it hard to live up to the standards that you have set.

4. So long as we have in the armies of the British Empire officers and men who will do as you have done, then we can indeed look forward with complete confidence to the future.

In years to come it will be a great thing for a man to be able to say:
"I fought at ARNHEM"

5. Please give my best wishes, and my grateful thanks to every officer and man in your Division.

(Sgd) B.L.Montgemery

Field Marshal, C.-in-C., 21 Army Group.

In The Field.

HEADQUARTERS,
SECOND ARMY.

SEPTEMBER 29th, 1944.

My dear Urquhart,

Before you leave Second Army I want to tell you how much I appreciate the great action fought by your Division at Arnhem.

From the moment that you came under my command on September 17th until the day on which you were ordered to withdraw, you were fighting ceaselessly against odds, which increased as days went by.

I want all ranks in your splendid Division to know that this action of yours played a vital part in the whole Second Army Operation.

Thanks to the way in which you contained the enemy at Arnhem, we were able to secure the bridges at Nijmegen intact.

Please convey to them all my admiration and gratitude for their great work.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) M.C.Dempsey

To:-Commander 1 Airborne Division.

Reference: GOC/P/2

Commander 30 Corps is sending you a letter from himself and his Corps expressing their unstinted admiration and gratitude for the gallant part played by 1 Airborne Division in the Second Army's drive to cross the RHINE.

He will explain to you, and in his expression of opinion I absolutely concur, that without the action of the 1st Airborne Division in tying up, pinning down, and destroying in large numbers the German forces in the ARNHEM area, the crossing of the WAAL, the capture of the bridges at NIJMEGEN and, above all, the advance from the bridgehead, would have been quite impossible.

I am intensely proud of the magnificent fight put ip by your Division With you, I deeply regret the saxrfice that has been entailed in the Division which I had the honour to raise originally.

I hope to have an opportunity of telling them scmething of the course of the whole Airborne operation and the drive of the Second Army north, before they are evacuated to ENGLAND. I should be grateful if you would afford me an opportunity which we can mutually arrange.

In the meantime, I do not hesitate to say that the operation, taken as a whole, has done more to speed up the war and further disrupt the already disorganized German Army than any other action up to date. In fact, none other than an Airborne operation could possible have achieved the result.

BLA 26 Sep 44 (Sgd) FAM Browning Lieut-General Commander British Airborne Corps.

COPY.

From: Commander 30 Corps, Second Army.

Main HQ 30 Corps

To: - Commander 1st Airborne Division.

26 Sep 44.

I want to congratulate you and all ranks of your Division on their tremendous achievements during the last eight days of fighting. We realize that, had it not been for you, we should have had no chance whatever of securing the NIJMEGEN bridges intact.

I am afraid that your losses have been very heavy, but in your fighting NORTH of the NEDER RIJN you contained a large number of German reserves, and while your Parachute Brigade was holding the NORTH end of the bridge at ARNHEM, you prevented any reinforcements from moving down towards NIJMEGEN. This just gave us time to secure these vital bridges.

There is no doubt that this may quite likely have a decisive influence on the war, and will, at any rate, I am certain, shorten the period of the war by several weeks.

Well done First Airborne Division!

On behalf of the Second Army - many thanks.

(Sgd)B.G.Horrocks Lt.Gen. Commander 30 Corps. Subject: Operation "MARKET"

To: Officer Commanding,

64 Medium Regt., R.A.,

B. L. A.

On behalf of the 1st Airborne Division I wish to thank you, your Regiment, and 419 Heavy Battery for the support given to us during the last week.

It is quite obvious now that the part the Regiment played in the battle of ARNHEM was a deciding factor in the survival of the Division for the nine days it spent NORTH of the River RHINE. At the time your Regiment Came into action in support of us, things were looking fairly black, and your fire just made all the difference. It was not only the devastating and very accurate effect produced by your fire during the last six days of our battle that had such a heartening effect on all ranks of the Division, but also the way in which all calls were sp promptly enswered.

The Commanders of 30 Corps and the Airborne Corps have agreed to our request that we may be allowed to present your Regiment with our Airborne sign, the Pegasus, to be worn on the lower half of the right sleeve. We shall regard it as a great privilege if you will undertake to wear this as a lasting remembrance of our liaison during the battle of ARNHEM.

I hope I shall have an opportunity of seeing your Regiment in the future and thanking them personally for their efforts.

27 Sep 44. B. L. A. (SGD) R.E.URQUHART.
Major General
Commander 1 Airborne Division.

COPY

From 6 Airborne Div

261450A

To: 1 Airborne Div (via Airborne Corps)

o 213 (.) magnificent achievement (.) all ranks thrilled with your epic battle (.) good luck to you

IMMEDIATE

HQ AB V MAROF 'P'

FROM SICTR WAROF

TO SIGMR HQAB

SS772 . RESTRICTED . HEREWITH COPY OF PIGEON MESSAGE RECEIVED AT HEAR 61 DIV 261400 . ADDRESS TO REAR AIRBORNE FORCES HQ ADDRESS FROM O C 2nd PARA DN.

ORIGINATORS NO WF L . DATE 18 . TEXT .

2ND EN CAPTURED NORTH END MAIN ER AT 172000 .

NOW HOLDING PERIMETER 300 YDS RADIUS FROM BRIDGE . EDE HQ AND C COY 3RD BN WITHIN THIS PERIMETER . C COY 2ND BN HOLDING BUILDINGS 42 ON TOWN PLAN . 1ST EN ABOUT 1MILE WEST OF ER ADVANCING AGAINST LIGHT OPPOSITION .

3RD EN POSN LESS C COY UNKNOWN . 2ND EN CAS ABOUT 60.

ENEMY CAS DUE TO 2ND EN APPROX 400 . ENEMY DEF OF TOWN LIGHT.

ENEMY ARMO CARS TOTAL 20 CROSSED ER DURING LAST MM 1/2 HR 10

DESTROYED . EXPECT TO CAPTURE SOUTH OF ER TONIGHT . ADDITIONAL AMN

ESPECIALLY A TK REQUIRED . END OF TEXT . TOO 0845 .

SIGNED D.W. WALLER MAJOR.

## PERSONAL FOR GENERAL BROWNING FROM MAJ.GEN.URQUHART.

I MUST WARN YOU THAT UNLESS PHYSICAL CONTACT IN SOME STRENGTH IS MADE WITH US EARLY 25 SEP I CONSIDER IT UNLIKELY THAT WE CAN HOLD OUT ANY LONGER. ALL RANKS ARE NOW COMPLETELY EXHAUSTED AS THE RESULT OF 8 DAYS CONTINUOUS EFFORT. LACK OF FOOD AND WATER AND DEFICIENCY. IN ARMS COMBINED WITH HIGH OFFICER CASUALTIES RATE HAS HAD ITS EFFECT. EVEN COMPARITIVELY MINOR ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION MAY CAUSE COMPLETE DISINTEGRATION. SHOULD THIS BECOME APPARENT ALL WILL BE TOLD TO BREAK TOWARDS THE BRIDGEHEAD IF ANY RATHER THAN SURRENDER CONTROLLED MOVEMENT FROM PRESENT POSITION IN FACE OF ENEMY IS OUT OF THE QUESTION NOW. WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

## Part V - DETAILED REPORTS BY ARMS OTHER THAN INF (in secerate folder)

Q. Report by G (Int), 1 dirborne Div.
R. " " CRA, 1 Airborne Div.
S. " " CRE, 1 dirborne Div.
T. " " CC, 1 Airborne Div. Signals
U. " ADES, 1 Airborne Div.