

CHAPTER FIVE

TEAM EDWARD

"The Dutch liaison party provided by SFHQ for Airborne Corps HQ did excellent work...."

First Allied Airborne After Action Report on
Operation Market Garden

Assigned Missions

Following Linnet II's cancellation on 7 September, the 21st Army Group and the First Allied Airborne Army developed plans for Operation Comet. Comet was a natural successor to Linnet, and SFHQ modified its previous support to now include its Dutch Jedburgh teams (designated the Dutch Liaison Mission or DLM) for this Allied airborne assault into Holland. After planners revised Comet on 8 September, the DLM consisted of the Headquarters Mission team, EDWARD, and its sub-missions: team CLAUDE, attached to the British 1st Airborne Division, team CLARENCE, attached to the U.S. 82d Airborne Division, and team DANIEL II, newly assigned and attached to the U.S. 101st Airborne Division. This configuration remained unchanged throughout Operation Market Garden. SFHQ attached EDWARD to the airborne corps HQ to act as liaison with the local

population and to provide an additional communications for the airborne corps with England. In its principle mission as liaison between corps and SFHQ, EDWARD would coordinate the work of its sub-missions with their assigned divisions and act as an additional communications link for these sub-missions to SFHQ. The teams would refer all matters of policy affecting resistance groups in their area to EDWARD for coordination.

Upon landing, team EDWARD would come under the command of the airborne corps headquarters, advising its commander on the use of resistance groups in support of corps operations. The team would establish contact with the local population and the Dutch underground movement, providing guidance to resistance leaders and identifying and vetting recognized resistance organizations when encountered. EDWARD and its sub-missions were to establish direct W/T communications with SFHQ's home station as soon as possible after arrival in the field. Due to its complicated mission, EDWARD would use two operators conducting a 24 hour radio watch at all times. (1)

Actions Prior to Market Garden

Team EDWARD was composed of Captain J. Staal (Royal Netherlands Army) who was in charge of the HQ Mission,

Captain McCord Sollenberger (U.S. Army), and Technical Sergeant James. R. Billingsley (U.S. Army). With the exception of team CLARENCE, the entire Dutch Liaison Mission (DLM) reported to airborne corps headquarters, Moor Park, on Thursday, 14 September 1944 to coordinate procedures. Following a briefing by the corps intelligence officer on the scope of the operation and the expected role of the DLM, Captain Staal then briefed the conference on Jedburgh operating procedures. (2)

Stationed at Moor Park in the days preceding D-day, team EDWARD collated and developed valuable intelligence for corps Hq on the Market Garden area of operations. The team procured various terrain studies and, with the assistance of the SFHQ Dutch Country Section, and the current enemy order of battle. In addition to preparing for the mission and collecting intelligence during this hectic time, EDWARD conferred with the corps chief of staff, the G2, and civil affairs officers to refine the missions of the DLM teams. These revised mission tasks included assisting the operation through employment of local resistance forces, and providing intelligence to the command from local resistance groups both inside and outside the airhead. After teams assisted in vetting members of the resistance, they would recommend or select

individuals to be used as guides, guards, patrols, or other military contingencies such as the building of landing strips. (3)

On Friday, 15 September, team EDWARD and its attached personnel assembled at Harwell Transit Camp in readiness for the operation. Due to its extensive communications and liaison missions, SFHQ had assigned team EDWARD Captain R. Mills (British Army), who would serve as an additional liaison officer, and Second Lieutenant L. Willmott (British Army) who would serve as an additional W/T operator.

The team gathered for the corps HQ Market Garden operations briefing on 16 September. Captain Staal reviewed for the staff the activities of the DLM and the planned use of resistance forces. The team later packed its assigned glider with its kit, including a jeep and trailer loaned from the SAS. The corps HQ assigned four members of EDWARD to this glider, while Captain Staal would travel in the glider of the G2 I. (4)

Deployment and Initial Actions

The team took off from Harwell Transit Camp with the rest of advance corps HQ at H Hour, 1120 hours 17

September 1944. Its glider encountered no fighter or flak opposition on its journey, and landed perfectly at its landing zone (LZ) near Groesbeek at 1410 hours. Upon landing, the team unpacked its glider, drove along an assigned route to the advance corps HQ assembly area, and then proceeded with other HQ staff personnel to the operations center area located near Mooksche Raan. Enemy opposition in and around Groesbeek was slight, and the corps staff took some prisoners. At 2000 hours, the team reported to SFHQ that it had arrived safely, but had not yet contacted any resistance forces. In the late evening, they established contact with the local Groesbeek underground, an organized force of approximately 300 men. Some of these men were already assisting the ground forces. Because the military situation was uncertain, the team did not immediately employ this force, although it noted the cooperative attitude of the local populace in a report to SFHQ the following day. (5)

The following morning on 18 September, EDWARD accompanied the corps HQ to a new operations center location in the woods near Groesbeek. It visited the nearby village of Malden and contacted the local resistance, arranging a meeting with the OD leadership of Malden, Heumen, Overaasselt and Mook. EDWARD discovered at

this meeting that the groups were operationally ineffective because of internal strife and political in-fighting, and later resolved these problems at a mass meeting at Malden town hall. 200 members of the local resistance attended, and EDWARD organized these men for operations with the 82d Airborne Division, which was fighting nearby. (6) In addition, the team released 50 of its orange arm bands to resistance leaders at Malden for wear by members, who began acting as guides and scouts for the local commander. The team reported to SFHQ that the resistance detention of local collaborators was well organized. (7)

Although the D+1 resistance situation was satisfactory, the operational situation was another story. Advance corps HQ communications were poor. The corps could talk to the 82d Airborne Division and at times to the Rear CP in London, but transmissions to XXX Corps and the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem were ineffective. (8) EDWARD's message to SFHQ reflected the growing concern at Corps HQ:

Most urgent. Corps needs information concerning military situation Arnhem. Watermark {SFHQ} ask CLAUDE for latest details and send us all information already available. (9)

EDWARD investigated a reported underground telephone link to Arnhem but found nothing. They did establish telephone communications with the telephone switch center in the town

of Nijmegen, which was still occupied by the Germans. CLARENCE, which had lost its wireless set on the initial drop, sent valuable information over this line to corps HQ on the local military situation and the defenses of the railway and highway bridges across the Waal River. CLARENCE also reported to EDWARD that Lieutenant Verhaeghe had been wounded and was out of action and that Captain Bestebreurtje had also been wounded but was still active. As a result, EDWARD appointed Captain Sollenberger to act as a direct liaison between CLARENCE and the Corps HQ. (10)

Actions from 18 September through 23 September

The advance corps HQ moved early on D+2 to De Kluis (south of Nijmegen) to be on the main axis of advance. Their communications were now good with the nearby 82d Airborne Division, XXX Corps and Second Army. Transmission exchanges with airborne base in England, however, remained unreliable and slow. (11) EDWARD, using resistance operated telephone lines, was the first element in the Corps to make contact with the British 1st Airborne Division in Arnhem, which was engaged in heavy fighting with the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. EDWARD passed messages and instructions from the airborne corps commander

to the 1st Division Commander through this channel, and reported all intelligence from Arnhem to the corps staff.

In conjunction with team CLARENCE, EDWARD held a meeting of resistance leaders from the district of Nijmegen and organized resistance actions to support the 82d Airborne Division's unsuccessful assault on the bridge across the Waal. EDWARD had furnished 100 men from the local Dutch populace to the corp HQ for construction of a landing strip for light aircraft at De Kluis, which was completed early that morning. The team requested that SFHQ dispatch an arms shipment for the local gendarmerie, but air supply operations were not authorized. (12)

Bad weather persisted on D+3, preventing corps logistical reinforcement and resupply from First Allied Airborne Army in England. XXX Corps linked up with the 82d Airborne Division at Nijmegen, and the advance corps HQ moved at 1500 hours to the southern outskirts of Nijmegen. (13) Upon link up, EDWARD arranged a meeting through its underground channels with the XXX corps engineer and the chief engineer for water works and ferries for the town of Nijmegen. In subsequent conferences with this engineer and other local figures, XXX Corps obtained detailed intelligence on bridges and river crossing areas in and around Nijmegen. In a separate conference with civil

affairs officers, EDWARD planned future actions for local vetted civilians and resistance forces in both corps and CLARENCE's areas of operations.

In conjunction with the advance corps HQ move to Nijmegen, EDWARD established a signal office at the St Anna Hospital in Nijmegen and employed two women of the local resistance for code and cipher work. Signal traffic was extremely heavy for EDWARD's radio operators, and EDWARD requested SFHQ reduce its traffic to mission essential messages. (14) The team informed SFHQ that advance corps Headquarters was delighted with the excellent work of the nine resistance groups in the Market area. Resistance groups were well organized in the Nijmegen, Arnhem, and Malden areas and the Allies used them extensively as guides and prisoner guards. According to EDWARD they provided "first class tactical information not otherwise available." (15)

SFHQ dispatched three important messages to EDWARD on 20 September. The first, a directive from Prince Bernhard's HQ to all Dutch agents in the field, stated that the Prince entrusted his leadership to the OD-RVV-KP Triangle. In places where this leadership was insufficient, the triangle would nominate local leadership. The second message concerned team DUDLEY, which had radioed London

that it had dispatched a partisan messenger that day to contact the Allied HQ in Arnhem. SFHQ requested EDWARD relay this message to CLAUDE, which had not established communications. (16) In a separate message relayed from DUDLEY, SFHQ provided valuable intelligence to EDWARD and its sub-missions on German activity in the Overijssel area. The Germans had ordered all men 17 to 45 to report for construction of defensive barriers along the Ijssel River near Olst and Wyne. The Germans were rapidly augmenting their forces east of Ijssel and fortifying the Waal line, because heavy concentrations of airborne units were nearby. In addition, DUDLEY reported that German Command HQ for Holland, designated HQ Christiansen for its commander, Luftwaffe General Friedrich Christiansen, arrived in Denikamp. (17)

EDWARD continued to maintain its communications link with the British 1st Airborne Division in Arnhem. Corps wireless communications with the "Red Devils" remained erratic and unreliable. According to the Corps after action report for D+3,

The Dutch liaison party provided by SFHQ for Airborne Corps HQ did excellent work in establishing telephone communication with the Dutch Resistance and getting their reports on the situation at Arnhem. (18)

Nevertheless, EDWARD could not contact team CLAUDE or

DANIEL II on its Jed sets. EDWARD informed London about CLARENCE's situation, and SFHQ radioed back that an air resupply mission for the 82d Airborne Division contained a new wireless for that team. (19)

On D+4, main British Airborne Corps HQ joined the advance HQ at Nijmegen. During the morning hours, EDWARD finally contacted DANIEL II at Eindhoven. The team had lost their crystals, and had had minimal contact with the resistance. DANIEL II's participation in various engagements with the 101st Airborne Division precluded accomplishment of their primary mission, and up to this point, they had only managed to collect local intelligence for the division's intelligence officer. That afternoon, Major Wilson of DANIEL reported to Nijmegen to personally update EDWARD on his team's progress and to review the current situation of the 101st Airborne Division, which remained under incessant German attacks and raids. EDWARD'S officers redirected DANIEL's activities to compliment resistance operations in the Nijmegen area until the team could be exfiltrated. Subsequent to this meeting, EDWARD arranged with the G2, 101st Airborne Division to withdraw DANIEL from operations as soon as 12th and 8th Corps had advanced beyond the 101st Airborne Division flanks. (20)

EDWARD's resistance telephone links with the British 1st Airborne Division remained a vital intelligence source and communications link for the corps HQ. Over this line, they obtained eye witness reports on the drop of the Polish Parachute Brigade and the subsequent German response. The team still could not contact CLAUDE, however.

Work with the Dutch Resistance was very effective. In a message to SFHQ, EDWARD reported their effective detention of German collaborators and called the liberated population "magnificent." EDWARD continued to effectively coordinate civilian affairs and resistance activities with CLARENCE, who established a vital intelligence and communications center with links to resistance organizations throughout Holland. This operation was so effective that XXX Corps and the Second Army immediately commandeered the makeshift station as part of their own C3I infrastructure. (21)

The weather on D+5, 22 September, was again bad for the fourth straight day. Air supplies to the corps decreased and German opposition stiffened. EDWARD still had no contact with CLAUDE, and attempted to infiltrate from Nijmegen into Arnhem to determine the situation there. Mounting German opposition augmented by tanks made movement

to the north difficult, and prevented EDWARD from reaching the city or contacting the Oudenhoff RVV located nearby.

EDWARD coordinated with both XXX Corps and Second Army on 22 September, discussing the resistance situation with Captain Strutt of the Army's SF Detachment Number 1 and later with the XXX Corps Civil Affairs Office. The XXX Corps, which now controlled Nijmegen, was concerned about the uncertain status and future role of resistance forces in the area now that German forces had withdrawn. The XXX Corps civil affairs officer expressed these concerns to EDWARD, which subsequently arranged to have CLARENCE organize an armed resistance force of approximately 300 men for "mopping up operations" of isolated enemy pockets. In addition, the corps agreed that resistance forces would continue to perform military tasks until hostilities ceased. Upon release by their assigned military liaison or commander, the resistance would then fall under control of the local Burgomasters for civil use. XXX Corps modified these plans on D+6. After consulting with EDWARD, the corps decided that resistance groups operating in its area would not carry arms. (22)

As a result of their conferences on D+5 and D+6 with XXX Corps, EDWARD felt its mission was complete. Captains Mills and Staal had discussed their situation D+5

with the corps chief of staff, who concurred that the team be reassigned upon arrival of XXX Corps tactical units in the area. The resistance was fully organized and did not require stores. In a message to SFHQ on 23 September, Captain Mills, the British liaison officer attached to EDWARD for this mission, requested permission to return the following week. Captain Staal and the rest of the EDWARD Jedburghs preferred to remain in Holland, operating with resistance forces in the northern part of the country. In another message to London later the same day, EDWARD considered its mission would be completed once it contacted CLAUDE in Arnhem that evening. Captain Staal requested an immediate reply to his proposal to operate in north Holland. He termed the situation "urgent" and reported:

...possibilities Overijssel-Drente {area} seen promising but recall London and redropping must be done very quickly. Team keen to go and confident of success after experience of Dutch resistance. (23)

Attempts to Find Team CLAUDE

Airborne Corps HQ remained in the same location throughout D+8, and assumed command of the Royal Netherlands Brigade for the defense of the Grave bridge. The corps HQ also assumed responsibility for the defense of the Nijmegen bridges and the bridge over the Maas-Waal canal. (24) In the evening hours, EDWARD advanced from

this HQ location, and proceeded with great difficulty to the south bank of the Rhine near Driel, opposite the forward most fighting positions of the 1st Airborne Division. The entire area was under withering fire, and EDWARD aborted its plan to cross the river and contact CLAUDE, attached to the division's 1st Brigade. EDWARD could not contact Division HQ, which was also across the Rhine, but reports indicated that Lieutenant Knottenbelt, a Royal Netherlands Army officer assigned to CLAUDE the week before D-day as an additional liaison officer, was slightly wounded. These same reports postulated that the entire team was killed in action in the fighting around Arnhem. EDWARD reported to SFHQ the following day: "Have not much hope for them but will find out at earliest possible moment." (25)

On Sunday, 24 September (D+7), EDWARD returned from the Arnhem area and reported CLAUDE's situation to SFHQ. The team again contacted sub-mission DANIEL at Veghel. Captain Mills reported that Major Wilson of the British Army had performed well for the 101st Airborne Division, continuing to collect intelligence from the local population. DANIEL had contacted virtually no resistance forces the past seven days. However, the team informed EDWARD that Lieutenant Dubois, a Royal Netherlands Army

officer assigned to DANIEL the week prior to D-day for liaison duties, was unsatisfactory. Dubois was not a Jedburgh and evidently his actions did not meet the expectations of Major Wilson, DANIEL II's Team Leader. (28)

EDWARD continued its liaison duties with resistance forces while attempting to arrange its own exfiltration. They met with the leader of the St Oedenrode resistance, who reported that the airborne forces had fully employed his men. A KP member from Utrecht passed through enemy lines to report that his KP group had 60 members, arms and explosives, and was very active. EDWARD later sent one of its men (probably Captain Staal) to instruct this group to disrupt enemy rail transport. EDWARD obtained additional information on the Utrecht area from a rendezvous at Oudenhoff with an officer of the Dutch intelligence service in the Resse-Bennel area. This officer maintained a network of 30 W/T sets and information offices around the country. Team EDWARD provided him a corps W/T set to contact HQ. EDWARD reported all information collated from these sources to both the airborne corps HQ and XXX Corps.

Three members of the 25 man Kesteren KP resistance group also infiltrated German lines to inform EDWARD on enemy dispositions in the Tiel area and along the Waal River. The airborne HQ thought this information extremely

valuable, and that evening had EDWARD dispatch them with false documentation to collect additional information. EDWARD passed information to the Utrecht KP via this group. With rail traffic now completely halted, EDWARD instructed both groups to only collect intelligence. (27)

On 28 September (D+9), the British 1st Airborne Division withdrew from Arnhem. EDWARD reported to SFHQ that team CLAUDE was still missing in Arnhem and that Lieutenant Knottenbelt was last seen the night of 25 September on the northern bank of the Rhine. Despite attempts to identify Knottenbelt among the evacuated paratroopers who were passing through Nijmegen, EDWARD could not find him or trace his whereabouts.

On D+8, the team contacted the Oss resistance forces and arranged a meeting in Oss with its Burgomaster, its OD leader and two separate KP leaders (one of whom was from Oss), and the district leader of the resistance in E. Brabant. At this meeting on D+9, the team resolved the friction between the local OD and KP, and coordinated their activities. EDWARD dispatched 40 men of the KP to the Maas-Waal line to attack enemy communications lines and to gather intelligence, and sent an agent to the Utrecht area to pass similar instructions to the 80 man KP organization located there. In a message to SFHQ, EDWARD reported that

all resistance forces outside Oss were armed, that the total Oss resistance forces numbered 100 men partly armed, and that the entire area required no additional weapons.

(28)

EDWARD notified SFHQ that it intended to proceed to Brussels as soon as it completed these ongoing missions. The team prepared to exfiltrate along with personnel from teams DANIEL II and CLARENCE. Although it had never made effective contact with the resistance, DANIEL II had fulfilled its mission and had been ready to evacuate for several days. CLARENCE was still contributing important intelligence data to the 82d Airborne Division and carrying on highly successful liaison activities with resistance forces. Its team Leader, Captain Arie Bestebreurtje and its radio operator, Sergeant Willard Beynon elected to remain in Holland.

Exfiltration and Summary of Activities

On 27 September (D+10), EDWARD completed final preparations for its departure. Several days earlier they had instructed DANIEL II to report to the SF Detachment Number 3 of the 21st Army Group in Brussels, and had arranged for CLARENCE to continue supporting the 82d Airborne Division in and around Nijmegen until cessation of

operations in that area. Prior to leaving Nijmegen, EDWARD relinquished its B-2 set to CLARENCE (whose own set was destroyed on impact during the D-day drop) to maintain communications with SFHQ in London. EDWARD then reported to SF Detachment Number 1, Second Army Headquarters, and proceeded on to Brussels. They flew to England the following day, 28 September. (29)

EDWARD's mission was highly successful. Upon their attachment to the corps HQ in England, they immediately proved invaluable by producing terrain studies and enemy information from the Dutch Country Section that was not previously available to planners. During the actual operation, their liaison with the local populace and resistance forces produced willing labor for constructing airstrips, guarding prisoners, patrolling, and copious information on the enemy situation and Dutch collaborators. Resistance augmentation enabled soldiers to return to the desperate battles which characterized the Market Garden operation. The corps after action report noted: "Their liaison with the resistance was good throughout and most valuable." (30)

The team's mission with the resistance was not without problems. The Dutch were overjoyed to be liberated, and EDWARD found it difficult to distinguish

between friendly civilians and actual resistance forces who desired to assist the Allied forces. In the later stages of Market Garden, the team added an official stamp on the orange arm bands and identification cards to identify genuine resistance members. Nevertheless, they discovered that German penetration of some resistance groups continued even after a town's liberation, and counter intelligence agents detained approximately ten alleged enemy agents. EDWARD reported that the small resistance groups or parties in Holland were well organized in almost every town, but in some cases failed to cooperate with one another or to understand EDWARD's directives. The team had to organize competing resistance groups under one leader at many locations, and recommended to SFHQ that:

a definite policy be laid down as regards to arming Dutch resistance and the use of them, as in many cases contradictory opinions were encountered and in some cases misunderstandings occurred. (31)

Through their resistance contacts and continuous, efficient communications with SFHQ in London, they proved to be an invaluable source of information to the operations staff in Airborne Corps HQ, whose own communications was inadequately staffed, unreliable, and slow. Most importantly, team EDWARD provided initial intelligence on the ill-fated British 1st Airborne Division when no other sources were available. Throughout the operation, they

supplied the bulk of the reports on the situation in Arnhem. With its one B-2 set, EDWARD was the sole communications link between SFHQ and all three of its sub-missions, who had lost their Jedburgh sets upon landing. EDWARD established 24 hour communications with London immediately, transmitting a total of 28 messages and receiving 48 on its ten day mission. (32)

CHAPTER FIVE

ENDNOTES

1. OSS/London SO Branch micro. Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July-December 1944, Operations Team EDWARD (Hereafter referred to as Team EDWARD Report), pp. 1-2, and 7.; National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAEF G3 Division Airborne Section File Number 24571, "Operation Market." Appendix D to 18th Airborne Corps OPORD, HQ AirTrps/TS/2581/G, 13 September 1944. (Cited hereafter as 18th Airborne Corps OPORD.)

SFHQ agents on the ground reporting special intelligence would request to see division and brigade intelligence officers using the password "Telephone," and EDWARD and its sub-missions were to ensure their assigned units immediately passed these operatives to division HQ. (EDWARD explained these procedures to its teams at a meeting with Airborne Corps Headquarters at Moor Park on 14 September.). 18th Airborne Corps OPORD.

2. Team EDWARD Report, pp. 6-7.

Captain McCord Sollenberger survived the war and bought a farm in Maryland. Captain Staal, originally from South Africa, returned there after the war. Sergeant Billingsley settled in Ohio. All three men on EDWARD are now deceased; Daphne Friele, letter to the author dated 10 October 1989.

After their initial briefings in London, SFHQ issued the team 10,500 guilders, one B-2 set and one Jedburgh W/T set. At the briefing at Moor Park, Captain Staal explained that the sub-missions fell under the command of their assigned Division Commander; that they would act in an advisory capacity to the G2 or to the local unit commander in vetting and organizing resistance forces. They would transmit orders from the division G2 or local unit commander to the leaders of the resistance, supervising the execution of these orders. Team EDWARD Report, pp 6-7.

3. Ibid., p. 8. Prior to the corps operations briefing held on 16 September, the corps HQ communicated these

detailed mission tasks and Jedburgh policies to the corps subordinate commands and their attached sub-missions.

4. Ibid., pp. 8-9. Neither Captain Mills or Lieutenant Willmott was a Jedburgh.

5. Ibid., pp. 2-3, and 9.

6. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

7. Ibid., pp. 2-3, 10.

8. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAEF G3 Division Airborne Section File Number 24571, "Operation Market." First Allied Airborne Army After Action Report, "Report on Operations 'Market' and 'Garden'". (Undated) (Cited hereafter as FAAA Report), p. 9.

9. Team EDWARD Report, p.10.

10. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

The Dutch had developed a "secret" telephone network for their own use. At the time, Dutch telephone numbers were four digits. A telephone technician named Nicolaas Tjalling de Bode improvised a procedure to bypass local switchboards. By dialing certain numbers, the underground was able to call all over Holland; Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 144.

11. FAAA Report, p. 10.

12. Team EDWARD Report, pp. 10-11. The Bomber Command in support of Market Garden operations refused to fly night operations over Holland during the non-moon period, and, although the 38th Group was prepared to fly at night, they were heavily committed elsewhere. The inclement weather also made all flying hazardous.

13. FAAA Report, p. 12.

14. Team EDWARD Report, p. 11.

15. Ibid., p. 3.

16. Ibid., p. 3; Olmsted, pp. 48-54. Authors note: There is no mention in the team after action Reports of EDWARD or CLAUDE making contact with Dolf, DUDLEY's messenger.

DUDLEY's report states that Dolf spoke with Captain Staal on Arnhem's telephone line to Nijmegen and reported on the friendly and enemy situation in Overijssel.

17. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 226, War Diaries of the London Office, Special Operations: Boxes 17-30. OSS/London War Diaries, Volume IV, JEDBURGHs, July, August, September 1944, Operations Team CLARENCE. (Cited hereafter as Team CLARENCE Report) p. 2.

18. FAAA Report, p. 12.

19. Team EDWARD Report, p. 3.

20. Ibid., p. 4, 11.

21. Ibid., p. 4, 12.

22. FAAA Report, p. 14; Team EDWARD Report, pp. 12-13. The corps told EDWARD that this was standard policy for resistance forces that were never incorporated into the armed forces of a country. To some degree, the decision may have been influenced by the British distrust of Dutch Resistance forces arising from "NORD POL." Powell, The Devil Birthday, pp. 101-102.

23. Team EDWARD Report, pp. 4-5, 12-13. Author's note: This last message is unusual. According to DUDLEY's reports, EDWARD was aware of the situation in the Overijssel Province and DUDLEY's deployment there. However, the text indicates EDWARD did not know DUDLEY's whereabouts or operations in eastern Holland.

24. FAAA Report, p. 16.


25. Team EDWARD Report, p. 5, 11. Two of the original members of CLAUDE had been killed, but Second Lieutenant H. Allen Todd, U.S. Army, survived the battle and the war. See Chapter Seven report on team CLAUDE.

26. Ibid., p. 5, 13. While on this mission, Technical Sergeant Billingsley had been wounded in the eye diving into a foxhole, and he received the Purple Heart.

27. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

28. Ibid., p. 6, 14.

29. Ibid., p. 6, 14.
30. FAAA Report, p. 12.
31. Team EDWARD Report, p. 15.
32. Ibid., pp. 15-16.



CHAPTER SIX

TEAM DANIEL II

"Our situation reminded me of the early American West, where small garrisons had to contend with sudden Indian attacks at any point along great stretches of vital railroad."

General Maxwell Taylor, describing the situation of the 101st Airborne Division in the Son-Eindhoven area

Assigned Missions

When the 21st Army Group and the First Allied Airborne Army expanded Operation Comet on 8 September, SFHQ had three of its four Dutch Liaison teams available to provide support. SFHQ had previously assigned team DUDLEY the responsibility of coordinating resistance operations in the Overijssel province, and now required an additional Jedburgh team for the added American airborne divisions. SFHQ responded by assigning team DANIEL II, a predominantly British Jedburgh team, to the Dutch Liaison Mission, and attaching it to the U.S. 101st Airborne Division for liaison between the Division's HQ and the local populace. The original Jedburghs assigned to DANIEL included Major R.K. Wilson and Sergeant G.W. Mason of the British Army. SFHQ subsequently attached Lieutenant Martin DuBois of the

Royal Netherlands Army to the team as liaison officer and interpreter for General Maxwell Taylor, the Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division. SFHQ attached another Dutch soldier, Sergeant Fokker, to augment the team's communications and liaison duties. The Dutch Country Section initially briefed these men, providing them a list of rendezvous points and contacts for Dutch resistance organizations in the area. (1)

The team's essential mission was to advise General Taylor on resistance capabilities, support division operations, and coordinate the actions of local resistance groups. SFHQ issued DANIEL II 5000 guilders and one Jedburgh Set, which provided the team with its own communications link to London. The team then reported to the 101st Airborne Division Headquarters at Greenham Lodge, Newbury on Tuesday, 12 September, and proceeded to Moor Park two days later to attend the airborne corps HQ operational briefings with the rest of the DLM. They returned to Greenham Lodge and attended the 101st Airborne Division's operations briefing on 15 September. Afterward, the men prepared their equipment for their mission to Holland. (2)

Deployment and Initial Actions

The 101st Airborne Division manifested the team and its equipment on three different aircraft (assigned to the division HQ) for the flight to Holland. Lieutenant DuBois accompanied General Taylor in Plane 2, Major Wilson flew in Plane 6, and Sergeants Wilson and Fokker were in Plane 9, which also contained the team's radio equipment loaded in one pannier and one leg-bag. All aircraft were in the first wave, and left Welford Airfield, located about 10 miles northwest of Newbury, about 1050 hours, 17 September. The trip was uneventful until 1320 hours when heavy flak over Holland seriously damaged Planes 6 and 9. The aircraft caught fire but held their positions in the massive formation. Both sticks jumped to safety six minutes later.

All men in team DANIEL II dropped without injury near Son. No trace of the team's radio equipment, which was to be door dropped out of the Plane 9, was found. The team had loaded the remainder of its personal kit and a spare radio set on a glider in the division's second lift, but most gliders in this lift were destroyed. The team recovered only a few personal items.

Team DANIEL quickly evacuated the DZ, and successfully arrived two hours later at the division HQ

collection point despite significant German shelling of the area. Lieutenant DuBois remained with General Taylor, and the rest of the team began operating out of the Division CP near Son. Major Wilson and the W/T operators had few initial resistance contacts, but obtained important information from local civilians. (2)

The 101st Airborne Division drop had achieved complete surprise. Ground opposition was light, and, by nightfall, division units had occupied Son, St Oedenrode and Veghel. (3) In the St Oedenrode area to the north of Son, the KP had met soldiers of the 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment on their DZ, led them to bridges over the Donnel River, and informed them on local enemy dispositions and organization. According the 101st Airborne Division staff, the KP was vital to the 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment's success in securing the bridges near St. Oedenrode. (4)

Actions During the Battles for Control of the Eindhoven-Nijmegen Corridor

For the next three days, the 101st Airborne Division fought hard to keep the corridor between Eindhoven and Nijmegen open. The German Fifteenth Army's fierce defense south in the division at Best threatened to cut off the Guards Armored Division spearhead, and drained General

Taylor's combat power. The Germans maintained pressure along the entire length of the 101st Airborne Division's 15 mile corridor, which the division soldiers tabbed "Hell's Highway." (5) For these three critical days, DANIEL II worked out of the division CP at Son. Their contacts with the resistance were limited due to periodic attacks on the CP, which they helped defend. On D+1 at 1000 hours, German troops infiltrated into the division DZ from the west, and were repulsed after intense fighting. The Germans mounted harassing attacks and raids in this vicinity for the next 48 hours.

During the night of 18 September, Royal Engineers of the Guards Armored Division, XXX Corps, constructed a Bailey Bridge to replace the bridge over the Wilhemina Canal near Son, which the Germans had blown the day before. The leading elements of the Guards Armored Division crossed this bridge at 0700 hours on 19 September, and by 1600 hours a large portion of the division had passed through Son on its way north towards the 82d Airborne Division in Nijmegen. (6)

Early Tuesday afternoon on 19 September, General Taylor ordered his entire 502d Parachute Regiment to capture Best. The attack was a success, forcing the Germans back toward the Wilhemina Canal, where they

conducted a disorganized withdrawal. This first major victory for Allied forces in Market Garden was tempered with yet another attempt to cut the main LOC leading to Nijmegen. (7) At 1700 hours four Mark V tanks and dismounted infantry, supported by considerable artillery fire, attacked the Armored Division's Bailey bridge from the east. General Taylor led his staff, including team DANIEL II, to reinforce the battle and defend the division CP. 101st Airborne Division paratroopers repulsed the attack on the bridge from the south side of the canal, but the town of Son and the division CP sustained numerous artillery hits. Several members of the division staff were wounded.

XXX Corps, the spearhead of the Guards Armored Division encountered pockets of German resistance along its avenue of advance, and could not link up with the 101st Airborne Division per Market Garden's operational schedule. With this delayed arrival of XXX Corps, Hell's Highway became a slim artery without protected flanks. DANIEL II members participated in the defense of Son and the bridge again in the morning hours of 21 September, when the enemy mounted yet another assault, this time from the east. (8) Once again, the 101st Airborne Division repulsed the attack. General Taylor later noted:

Our situation reminded me of the early American West, where small garrisons had to contend with sudden Indian attacks at any point along great stretches of vital railroad. (9)

On 21 September (D+4), EDWARD contacted DANIEL II at Son, and requested that Major Wilson report to Nijmegen for a situation update. CLAUDE's participation in the defense of the 101st Airborne Division Headquarters had precluded extensive liaison with resistance forces and, that afternoon, EDWARD redirected DANIEL's activities to better conform with resistance operations and the current situation to the north. Major Wilson's return to Son was difficult; the road was completely open from Nijmegen but German troops were in the vicinity of Uden, north of Veghel. Subsequent to this meeting, EDWARD arranged with the G2, 101st Airborne Division to withdraw DANIEL from operations as soon as 12th and 8th Corps had advanced beyond the 101st Airborne Division flanks. (10)

During the night of 21-22 September, the division CP moved north from Son to St Oedenrode. DANIEL II contacted the eight remaining members of the KP in St Oedenrode, and received additional intelligence on the enemy situation. During the night and early morning hours of 22 September, Dutch resistance forces in the villages and hamlets east of Veghel spotted a new Panzer Brigade in the area, and promptly alerted team DANIEL II at the

division CP. The warning arrived just in time. Twice in four hours, German tanks from this brigade attempted to drive from the east to seize the major bridges at Veghel and strangle the Allied corridor at its critical chokepoint between Eindhoven and Uden. The 101st Airborne Division, aided by British armor, succeeded in throwing back the assaults along four miles of this corridor. Uden, however, was cut off, and Lieutenant DuBois, who was in Uden at the time attempting to organize resistance forces there, was isolated from the division CP for 48 hours. (11)

The battle for this corridor would decide the fate of Arnhem. General Brian Horrocks, the commander of the Guards Armored Division, turned around some of his units bound for Arnhem to relieve the British 1st Airborne Division to instead support the General Taylor's desperate situation at Uden. (12) The following day the Germans heavily shelled St. Oedenrode in support of a well organized dismounted infantry assault from the west. Despite the Germans' use of numerous self-propelled guns, the 101st Airborne Division repelled the assault on the outskirts of town.

On 24 September the 101st Airborne Division reopened the road between St Oedenrode and Veghel, and at 1000 hours the Division CP moved north to Veghel. DANIEL

II recovered Lieutenant DuBois, and contacted the Veghel KP. This KP group, well organized and led, had recruited a number of competent people since the 101st Airborne Division landings, and continued to proficiently support Allied forces in the area. DANIEL II also contacted the Veghel ORDE DIENST, which had excellent relations with the KP and also functioned well. (13)

The 101st Airborne Division was housing over 400 German prisoners of war in a factory building in Veghel. When a large German task force with tanks and self propelled guns cut the road south of Veghel again on 24 September, the division dispatched paratroopers guarding these prisoners to assist the 502 Parachute Regiment in interdicting this force. General Taylor ordered Major Wilson to take charge of the prisoners, and Wilson coordinated with the Veghel KP to provide guards. (14) During the day, EDWARD contacted DANIEL II for a situation update, and learned that their resistance contacts were "almost nil" and that Major Wilson considered Lieutenant DuBois unsatisfactory for Jedburgh missions. EDWARD reported this to SFHQ, and noted Major Wilson's "good work" with the division. (15)

The fighting for the main access road from Veghel to Uden lasted almost two days. German shelling destroyed

some British vehicles and caused many civilian casualties in the town. The team lived on captured German rations, and the Veghel OD organized the distribution of limited food supplies to the civilians. During this period, the team received exfiltration instructions from DANIEL, and Lieutenant DuBois returned to Uden where the KP and OD were at odds. Their political infighting prevented effective support to the 101st Airborne Division. Lieutenant DuBois succeeded in improving relations between the organizations and coordinating some of their activities. He also took part in the close and confused fighting around Uden over those two days. (16)

DANIEL discovered in Veghel that a number of young men not aligned with any resistance movements were brandishing captured German and American weapons. The team had first noticed occurrences of this type in St Oedenrode, where unorganized gangs wearing armlets with the initials PAN roamed the streets, pilfering from farmers and the local population. These young men interfered with the actions of the police and the local civil administration. They were a nuisance during the intense battles for the main road leading to Nijmegen, and General Taylor ordered the KP to collect all American arms and return them to the division. By 25 September, as DANIEL was preparing to

exfiltrate to Brussels, the KP were prosecuting General Taylor's orders with great enthusiasm, and taking appropriate measures to suppress their undisciplined countrymen. DANIEL noted in their report that the KP "made every endeavor to cooperate with the American authorities." (17)

Exfiltration and Summation of Activities

The 101st Airborne Division, supported by the 50th Infantry Division, opened the main road on 26 September. The previous evening the team received orders from the airborne corps HQ to withdraw to London, subject to divisional approval. The division concurred, and DANIEL II left Veghel in a captured car for Brussels as soon as the road reopened. During their return to Brussels, they nearly entered German lines in the Tournhout region, but escaped capture via the Bourg-Leopold road to Brussels. There, they reported to SF Detachment Number 3 at 21st Army Group Headquarters the evening of the 26th. The SF Detachment Commander, Lieutenant Colonel M.A.W. Rowlandson, had Major Wilson and Lieutenant DuBois make a personal report to Prince Bernhard on their activities and the status of resistance forces in the Son-Veghel areas.

At 1800 hours on 27 September (D+10), DANIEL flew from Brussels and, two hours later, landed at Groenham Airfield. They then proceeded to London by train. (18)

DANIEL II's mission was not an overwhelming success. SFHQ assigned DANIEL to the DLM's Market Garden mission to replace DUDLEY, which was already operating in the Overijssel province. Major Wilson, the team leader, and Sergeant Mason, its chief radio operator, were the only Jedburghs on the team, and they did not speak Dutch. SFHQ augmented the team with Sergeant Fokker and Lieutenant DuBois who were native Dutch speakers but not trained in Jedburgh operations.

The team had minimal contact with resistance forces because of its participation in the defense of the 101st Airborne Division CP. DANIEL II simply did not have the luxury of time the other Jedburgh teams had to coordinate with resistance forces in their area. They participated in the fighting around Son, St Oedenrode, Veghel, and Uden. They did succeed in producing some intelligence from the local populace in the 101st Airborne Division area of operations, in resolving the dispute between competing resistance factions in Uden, and in guarding the Veghel POW facility, which enabled the 101st Airborne Division to

dispatch men to support forces retaking the critical main axis road.

SFHQ had no communications with DANIEL II the entire time the team was in the field. Team EDWARD routed all message traffic for DANIEL II from SFHQ. This may have hindered DANIEL's capabilities to react to the fast moving situation.


Evidently, Lieutenant DuBois' actions provided some problems for Major Wilson or else he would not have raised the issue with EDWARD on 24 September. There are no current references or accounts available to explain DuBois' actions and why they frustrated Major Wilson, so this facet of the mission will never be known. Perhaps there was a personality conflict between the two men. Certainly, Lieutenant DuBois proved his worth in Uden, where he settled the dispute between the KP and the OD during the period 24-25 September.

CHAPTER SIX

ENDNOTES

1. OSS/London SO Branch micro. Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHs, July-December 1944, Operations, Team DANIEL II (Hereafter referred to as Team DANIEL II Report), pp. 1-2; Major Wilson, Sergeant Mason and a Lieutenant Scherrer (nom de guerre, SAUVAGE) are thought to have compromised one of the Belgium Dutch teams which never deployed. Scherrer was killed in Algeria. Major Wilson was a Royal Artilleryman was in his 40's when he began training at Milton Hall. He wrote a book entitled Textbook of Automatic Pistols, 1884-1935, copyrighted in 1943 by Thomas G. Samworth. The book was printed in the USA by the Small-Arms Technical Publishing Company in Plantersville, South Carolina. Both Major Wilson and Sergeant Mason are deceased. Martin DuBois was a Dutch Commando who redeployed to Holland in November. He assisted in the evacuation of Major John Olmsted of team DUDLEY and numerous British 1st Airborne Division paratroopers out of the Arnhem area. Letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1989 to the author; telephone conversation between Major John Olmsted (ret.) and the author of 18 April 1990.
2. Team EDWARD Report, p. 7; 18th Airborne Corps OPORD. The 18th Airborne Corps' Market Garden Operations Order further defined the team's missions, which were discussed at the 101st Airborne Division's operations briefing at Greenham Lodge on 15 September.
3. Team DANIEL II Report, pp. 3-4.
4. FAAA Report, p. 7.
5. Team DANIEL II Report, p. 4.
6. Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, pp. 424-425.
7. Team DANIEL II Report, p. 4.
8. Ryan, pp. 424-425.

9. Ibid., pp. 424-425; Team DANIEL II Report, p. 4. Lieutenant DuBois participated on the attack of the bridge from the south side of the canal along with paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division.
10. Ryan, p. 425.
11. Team EDWARD Report, p. 12.; Team DANIEL II Report, p. 5.
12. Team DANIEL II Report, pp. 5-6; Ryan, p. 533-534.
13. Ryan, p. 534.
14. Team DANIEL II Report, p. 6. When DANIEL II contacted the Veghel KP, 15 of its original members were still alive. The OD in Veghel consisted of local citizenry formed to assist and then assume administration of the town upon occupation of Allied troops.
15. Ibid., p. 6. When the road reopened on 26 September, the KP guards evacuated the prisoners south to Oedenrode.
16. Team EDWARD Report, p. 5.
17. Team DANIEL II Report, pp. 6-7.
18. Ibid., pp. 5, 7.
19. Ibid. pp. 7-8. Lieutenant Colonel Rowlandson was an SOE officer who had been involved in early Jedburgh planning.



CHAPTER SEVEN

TEAM CLAUDE

"...sir, I think we might be going a bridge too far."

Lieutenant General Frederick Browning, Deputy Commander, First Allied Airborne Army, in a comment at the final conference at Montgomery's Headquarters on Operation Market Garden.

Assigned Missions

Since planning had begun for Operation Comet, SFHQ attached team CLAUDE to the British 1st Airborne Division ("The Red Devils") as part of the Dutch Liaison Mission. The team, initially consisted of Captain J. Groenewoud (Royal Netherlands Army), Lieutenant Harvey Allen Todd (U.S. Army) and Sergeant C.A. Scott (U.S. Army). They reported to London for their initial briefing on 5 September, and five days later received the outline for Operation Market Garden. Prior to receipt of its Market Garden mission, SFHQ attached Lieutenant M.J. Knottenbelt, a Dutch Commando but not trained as a Jedburgh, to the team as an additional liaison officer.

SFHQ attached team CLAUDE to the 1st Airborne Division to act as a liaison with the local population and

to provide an additional communications link between the division and London. Upon arriving in the field, they would take commands from the 1st Airborne Division and would advise its commander on resistance capabilities to support Division operations and to coordinate with local resistance groups for execution of these capabilities. (1)

On 14 September CLAUDE along with the entire DLM reported to airborne corps HQ at Moor Park. The team received briefings from the corps G2 on the scope of the operation and the enemy situation and from Captain Staal, the team leader for EDWARD and the overall commander of the DLM, on their refined missions (See Chapter 5, Team EDWARD.). (2) Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd derived a priority of tasks from these missions and their subsequent discussions with the 1st Airborne Division staff. They determined that, upon landing, they were to contact civilians to furnish labor parties for clearing the DZ and helping load supplies. They intended to commandeer all local transportation to help move their supplies and equipment into Arnhem. Once uploaded, the team would advance with the advance guard of 1st Brigade, 1st Airborne Division, and contact the ex-Burgomaster and ex-chief of police of Arnhem to resume governing the city until assisted by corps civil affairs officers. Once CLAUDE

accomplished these tasks, they would infiltrate ahead of Allied forces, providing updated enemy order of battle information to assist the corps advance. (3)

In its own operations order, British 1st Airborne Division attached team CLAUDE (excluding Lieutenant Knottenbelt) to its 1st Parachute Brigade. Upon completion of initial tasks with the brigade, they would revert to the command of Colonel Hilary Barlow, who was both the Deputy Commander of the 1st Air Landing Brigade and the designated post battle military-government chief of Arnhem, and begin their DLM mission tasks. (4)

Deployment and Initial Actions

As a result of this task organization, 1st Division separated the original team from Lieutenant Knottenbelt for the flight to Holland. Knottenbelt was in the first lift with the advance division HQ that took off from Gloucester Airfield at approximately 1035 hours on 17 September. Knottenbelt's glider, assigned to the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron, touched down at 1320 hours 600 yards west of the Wolfheze Psychiatric Institute west of Arnhem. Captain Groenewoud, Lieutenant Todd, and Sergeant Scott took off in a C-47 from Gloucester and experienced very little flak on their flight to the 1st Para Brigade DZ

near Oosterbeek, Holland. During the flight, Sergeant Scott asked the jumpmaster to drop his wireless set before he went out the door. The R.A.F. Flight Sergeant in charge decided that the set should be dropped last, and, as a result, the team never located its radio equipment. That prevented communications with Moor Park and SFHQ's home station. The team, however, dropped without injury on its assigned DZ at 1400 hours. (5)

Lieutenant Knottenbelt spent the afternoon determining the credibility of civilians who had offered their assistance to 1st Airborne Division patrols and contacting local resistance leaders. He could not find the division G2, and issued the orange arm bands to resistance forces without staff authorization. (6)

As soon as Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd hit the ground, they immediately began executing their essential tasks. Groenewoud marshalled civilians in Oosterbeek into work parties for clearing the DZ and loading supplies. Todd returned an hour later with farm carts and 30 civilians to clear the DZ, and dispatched Sergeant Scott to pick up the team's containers. Scott was to contact the division supply officer and return with him to Arnhem. Groenewoud and Todd then linked up the leading element of the 1st Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel John Frost's

Second Battalion, and advanced into Arnhem. Captain Groenewoud called the ex-Burgomaster and the ex-chief of police on the way, and discovered the German's Burgomaster, a Dutch collaborator, had fled the town. The team momentarily stopped at St Elizabeth Hospital, and then fought their way to the Forward Brigade HQ, which was under heavy fire. After visiting the Arnhem police station where a civilian reported on German activities, the team reached the main bridge, and crossed the highway with three British officers in an attempt to reconnoiter a suitable brigade HQ location. As they attempted to recross the highway, a small enemy armored force counterattacked from the north down the road, splitting CLAUDE from the main body of 2nd Battalion paratroopers. The 2nd Battalion repulsed this attack, and the team dashed across the highway and stayed the night with 2nd Battalion in a large two story structure. This building, which the brigade HQ also occupied, was on the west side of the road overlooking the bridge and the highway. The brigade had no contact with division HQ, and Groenewoud and Todd did not know the location of Sergeant Scott or Lieutenant Knottenbelt. (7)

During the evening hours of 17 September, Lieutenant Knottenbelt unsuccessfully attempted to contact Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd, and, throughout the

night, continued establishing contacts with civilians. These bands of volunteers helped locate supplies dropped in the woods and transported these supplies the following afternoon to the Arnhem-Utrecht road where Division vehicles collected them. In the afternoon, the lieutenant met Pieter Kruyff, the leader of the resistance in Arnhem. Kruyff and his men reported the dispositions of Lieutenant Colonel Frost's 2nd Battalion and its situation at the north end of the bridge. They convinced the lieutenant that both the Oosterbeek and Arnhem telephone exchanges were completely reliable. Knottenbelt verified their claims by calling the number the resistance said would reach the division's security officer, Captain Killick, who immediately reported his situation. Lieutenant Knottenbelt relayed all of this information to division HQ at 1800 hours, and later joined the new division headquarters location at the Hartenstein Hotel in Oosterbeek. (8)

Actions: 18 September-24 September

18 September was a difficult day for Lieutenant Colonel Frost's men and team CLAUDE at the bridge. The Germans conducted counterattacks at dawn and at 0700 hours. While Captain Groenewoud and the brigade signal officer attempted to raise division, Lieutenant Todd took up an OP

position in the rafters of the building which overlooked the highway and the bridge. Lieutenant Todd engaged German dismounted infantry and directed anti tank fire at armored columns from this position until a sniper's bullet glanced off his helmet. The round ricocheted into a window and fractured splinters and glass into his face. Todd was carried to the basement of the building, where he rested the remainder of the day. Captain Groenewoud notified Todd later in the day that he had contacted division and the situation was grim. Third Battalion defended a half a mile away and First Battalion was bogged down in the center of town. By the end of the day, fifteen men in the brigade HQ building had been killed or seriously wounded. (9)

At 0900 hours on 19 September, a resistance leader phoned Lieutenant Knottenbelt at division HQ to report that the situation for 1st Brigade soldiers in Arnhem was desperate and required immediate reinforcement. Knottenbelt called Captain Killick to verify this information, and the phone was answered in German. At 1200 hours, intense fighting in Oosterbeek severely damaged the Oosterbeek telephone exchange, and Lieutenant Knottenbelt had no further communications with Arnhem. He continued to recruit civilians, however, and had 50 organized under the command of a cleared local leader by 1800 hours. Of these

50 recruits, only six claimed to belong to any resistance organization. Most were young men who had been hiding from the Germans. (10)

The situation at the bridge for team CLAUDE and Frost's men worsened on 19 September. The Germans counterattacked at dawn and again at noon and conducted harassing attacks throughout the day. Lieutenant Todd returned to his OP position in the building that morning and in the early afternoon, manned a Bren gun, knocking out a 20mm Flak gun. Lieutenant-Colonel Frost and Major C.F.H. "Freddy" Gough, the brigade executive officer, both complimented Todd on his intrepid steadfastness. A civilian informed Captain Groenewoud that an armored column of 100 vehicles was enroute to Arnhem along the Amsterdam road, but the brigade could not raise division to confirm this report. By the afternoon the situation was critical. Frost now had 50 casualties in the building and no medical supplies. Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd attempted to reach a doctor's house two blocks away, but a sniper shot Captain Groenewoud through the head, killing him instantly. Lieutenant Todd had a civilian call the hospital for the supplies, but the Germans controlled the area around the hospital and prevented Dutch medical personnel from assisting British wounded. Todd returned to

the brigade HQ and resumed his OP position in the rafters where he again directed AT fire during yet another German counterattack at dusk. Major Gough had assumed command that afternoon after Lieutenant Colonel Frost had been wounded. The brigade had no food and very little ammunition. Resupply was impossible. (11)

On 20 September it became obvious to Lieutenant Knottenbelt that the division was surrounded and that civilian presence around HQ would only result in greater casualties from the constant shelling and mortar fire. Because of the gravity of the situation, the 1st Division G2 and Lieutenant Knottenbelt agreed to disband civilian recruits, enabling them to return to their homes or to hide in order to escape German reprisals. Knottenbelt gave the order and retained only a half dozen civilians, who proved themselves invaluable in the latter stages of the operation. On the afternoon of the 20th, Knottenbelt linked up with Sergeant Scott, who had spent two days unsuccessfully attempting to find his wireless set in spite of continual sniping around the DZ. (12)

The situation at the bridge completely unraveled on 20 September. Lieutenant Todd had remained in his OP throughout the night and continued to fire at targets on the bridge and in the streets below. The Germans had

surrounded the beleaguered HQ building, and Tiger tanks from the 10th SS Panzer Division were firing their 88s point blank at its walls. Casualties were heavy and Lieutenant Scott was knocked out of his OP position by a mortar shell that destroyed the building's rafters. The men in the building fought on throughout the day with dwindling supplies and ammunition. At dusk Lieutenant Todd had only two rounds left in his carbine and one grenade when the building caught fire. Major Gough directed all wounded outside and formed his remaining men into ten man groups to infiltrate to the rear. Todd was in charge of one group, and rushed out of the house to a burned out school building. The Germans approached the building, and the men ran for their lives until a machine gun cut down the group. Todd was knocked down, threw his last grenade to eliminate the machine gunner, and ran down the street through two or three burned out buildings. He hurtled a stone wall, and, hearing Germans, climbed a tree, where he decided to stay until morning. (13)

On 21 September, the 1st Airborne Division situation was very uncertain. Lieutenant Knottenbelt consulted with Captain Scott-Malden, who had assumed the duties of the division G2 after Major Maguire had been injured, and told him he would inform him of his location

daily. Lieutenant Knottenbelt then moved to a house on the northern side of the division's perimeter. (14) Lieutenant Todd spent the entire day in his tree, tying his belt around his arm and a limb so he would not fall if he dozed off. He had an unobstructed view of the Arnhem bridge which the Germans now occupied, and inwardly still hoped that XXX Corps would be able to punch through and rescue the division. In the evening he climbed down from the tree, crawled under a bush, and slept until morning. (15)

Lieutenant Knottenbelt escaped death on 22 September when the Germans shelled his house on the northern perimeter. All of the soldiers in the house except Knottenbelt were killed. Knottenbelt then joined a platoon of the Independent Parachute Company defending houses on the eastern portion of the perimeter. That afternoon the Independent Company commander ordered him to evacuate 50 civilians from several of these houses and escort them to the hospital nearby. Knottenbelt stated later that he saw Sergeant Scott for the last time that afternoon. (16) Lieutenant Todd hid in his bush all that day, with Germans passing within several feet of him. That evening it began to rain and Todd found shelter in a burned out machine shop approximately 100 yards from his bush. (17)

Lieutenant Knottenbelt fought from house to house on 23 September. That evening, team EDWARD infiltrated as far north as the south bank of the Rhine, and heard a report that Knottenbelt was still alive and the remainder of CLAUDE had been killed in action. This was the first news about CLAUDE since the team had deployed, and the following day, Captain Mills reported their situation to SFHQ in London, which had been seeking word since D-day. (18) Lieutenant Todd spent 23 September in the machine shop waiting for the Germans to discover him or XXX Corps to rescue him. He subsisted on pears and one swallow of water. (19)

Knottenbelt Exfiltrates and Todd is Captured

Lieutenant Knottenbelt continued fighting from house to house on 24 and 25 September. On 1900 hours on the 25th, the 1st Airborne Division HQ received orders from corps HQ to withdraw. The division staff attached him to a group of HQ personnel which exfiltrated to the south bank of the Rhine at 0200 hours on 26 September. Knottenbelt eventually returned to London, although SFHQ did not know of his survival until October. (20)

Lieutenant Todd remained in his bombed out machine shop until 27 September, when Germans looted the place and

captured him. The Germans moved Lieutenant Todd to a series of transit POW camps in Holland and then larger, permanent camps in Germany. He stayed at Oberursel and Limburg until the Germans sent him to Schubin, Poland on 10 November 1944. At the end of January 1945, Russian units were approaching Schubin, and for the next six weeks the Germans marched Todd and his fellow prisoners up to the Baltic and then down through the German cities of Magdeburgh and Erfurt. They arrived in Hannelburg, Germany on 9 March 1945. Of the 1,391 officers and men who started on this march, only 390 arrived at Hannelburg. An American reconnaissance task force liberated this camp on 27 March, and Todd joined the unit on lead tank. Germans ambushed the column that night, and recaptured Todd, returning him to the Hannelburg. The commandant evacuated the prisoners the following morning, and moved them in a southeasterly direction away from the advancing American forces. Todd successfully escaped this formation on 1 May, and took shelter in a nearby house until American units overran the area three days later. Todd reported to OSS Headquarters in Paris on 12 May 1945. (21)

SFHQ attempted to trace CLAUDE for weeks. On 30 September, the 21st Army Group radioed SFHQ that it had dispatched a liaison officer to the evacuated 1st Airborne

Division Headquarters in an attempt to trace CLAUDE. SFHQ never recorded his findings. A report dated 1 November 1944 from Captain C.P. Scott-Nalden of the 1st Airborne Division stated:

I have now heard that Captain Greenwood {sic}, the Dutch officer in charge of the team, was killed in action. Lt. Todd, the American officer, did very well in the battle for the main bridge, and was alive and unwounded when order {sic} were finally given for the force holding the bridge to disperse; it is though that he may be in hiding. Sergeant Scott was seen in the early stages, but nothing is known of what happened to him. (22)

CLAUDE's story was completed when Lieutenant Todd reported to Paris. If he had been killed, it is doubtful SFHQ would have ever been able to trace the actions of these brave men.

Summary of Activities and Conclusions

The dangerous tactical situation in Arnhem prevented CLAUDE from accomplishing its missions. From the time the team dropped with 1st Brigade and lost its radio until Lieutenant Todd was captured, CLAUDE struggled to survive against mounting German opposition. Both Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd demonstrated tremendous courage and fighting spirit in the battles at the main bridge at Arnhem, but they were not a factor in organizing the resistance or providing liaison between the beleaguered

British 1st Airborne Division and advance corps headquarters. The team had no communications and were completely isolated from the rest of the division in their combat actions at the bridge and in the town of Arnhem.

Lieutenant Knottenbelt achieved limited success with the resistance. He was able to organize a 50 man group and arrange the civilian recovery of supplies spread out over the drop zones. Moreover, he established contacts with local resistance leaders who provided invaluable intelligence on Lieutenant-Colonel Frost's 2nd Battalion in Arnhem. Knottenbelt believed that, had the situation been more fluid and XXX Corps linked up with the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem, civilian aid and resistance operations would have proven progressively more valuable.

Knottenbelt was disturbed, however, about certain aspects in the preparation and execution for this mission. First, it was extremely difficult for him to establish the identities of underground members because of lack of information on the local resistance leaders. Knottenbelt located and identified several resistance leaders by sheer luck, and recommended that future liaison missions have more specific information on their resistance contacts. He stated that the mission was standard liaison duty and that was more applicable to a "regular liaison mission fully

equipped with the necessary information to enable them to make a direct approach to the local Resistance Leaders."

(23)

Knottenbelt also commented on the role of the 1st Airborne Division staff in dealing with the Dutch populace and resistance. He stated that although CLAUDE was to act in an advisory capacity with these groups, the British Staff preferred to place the whole responsibility for identifying and organizing the Dutch on the shoulders of the available Dutch personnel. (24) This comment echoed the complaints of many Dutch in the Arnhem area, that the British failed to respond to underground offers for assistance. The Arnhem resistance groups were armed and ready to provide support to Frost's men at the bridge, but the British politely rejected their offers. The British wariness of the Dutch underground arose from the lingering aftermath of "NORD POL" in intelligence circles, and many senior British officers were warned before Operation Market Garden not place too much trust in the Dutch resistance.

(25)

Then there is the matter of Colonel Hilary Barlow, the Deputy Commander of 1st Brigade and the designated post battle military-government chief of Arnhem. Prior to Market Garden, an Anglo-Dutch intelligence committee had

issued Barlow top-secret lists of cleared Dutch underground personnel. From these lists, Barlow and his assistant, Lieutenant Commander Arnoldus Wolters of the Dutch Navy, were to screen the groups' capabilities, and dispatch them on intelligence, sabotage, and combat missions. According to Wolters, only he and Barlow knew about the lists and what their mission really was. When General Urquhart ordered Colonel Barlow to coordinate the faltering attacks of 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Para Brigade, Barlow was killed. When Wolters then produced the lists and made recommendations, the 1st Airborne Division staff immediately distrusted him. Despite Wolters persistent efforts, there was simply not enough time for other members of the staff to assist in properly identifying and organizing Dutch resistance forces. (26)

It is doubtful if team CLAUDE could have taken advantage of Wolters and Barlow's lists because of the worsening situation in Arnhem. However, SFHQ should have briefed them on this unique mission, which was one of the team's own essential tasks. Certainly Lieutenant Knottenbelt's efforts to identify and organize the resistance in Arnhem would have been expedited with the possession of these lists or the knowledge of their existence.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ENDNOTES

1. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 228, War Diaries of the London Office, Special Operations: Boxes 17-30. OSS/London War Diaries, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July, August, September 1944, Operations Team CLAUDE (Cited hereafter as Team CLAUDE Report), p. 1. SFHQ's instructions to CLAUDE were similar to other teams that comprised the L.M. Integral to these tasks was the vetting and identification of resistance forces when they were overrun. SFHQ issued CLAUDE 5000 guilders and one Jedburgh radio set, and instructed the team to contact the Home Station as soon as possible after their arrival.

Lieutenant Todd survived a series of German POW camps and eventually escaped in April, 1945. He is retired and currently lives in Decatur, Illinois. Lieutenant Knottenbelt redeployed to Holland on 3-4 April 1945 as part of Jedburgh team GAMBLING. Letter from Daphne Friele of 10 October 1980 to the author and letter from Gervase Cowell of 14 February 1980 to the author.

2. Team EDWARD Report, p. 7.

3. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 228, War Diaries of the London Office, Special Operations: Boxes 17-30. OSS/London War Diaries, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July, August, September 1944, Operations Team CLAUDE. H. Allen Todd. "Report on Operations Team CLAUDE" (Cited hereafter as TODD Report), p. 1.

4. British Notes on Resistance, pp. 1-3; Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 444;


5. British Notes on Resistance, pp. 1-3; Team CLAUDE Report, pp. 2-3; TODD Report, p. 1.

6. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 2.

7. TODD Report, pp. 1-2.

8. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 2.

9. TODD Report, p. 2.
10. Team CLAUDE Report, pp. 2-3.
11. TODD Report, pp. 2-3.
12. Team CLAUDE Report, pp. 2-3.
13. TODD Report, pp. 3-4.
14. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 3.
15. TODD Report, p. 4.
16. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 4.
17. TODD Report, p. 4.
18. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 4; Team EDWARD Report, p. 14.
19. TODD Report, p. 4.
20. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 3.
21. TODD Report, pp. 4-10.
22. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 1.
23. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 3.
24. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 3.
25. Ryan, pp. 444-445.
26. Ibid., p. 444.



CHAPTER EIGHT

TEAM CLARENCE

"The {Dutch} proved to be among the bravest and most patriotic people we had liberated"

Brigadier General John Gavin, Commanding General,
82d Airborne Division, Operation Market Garden

Assigned Missions

SFHQ had initially attached sub-mission CLARENCE to the British 52d Lowland Infantry Division as part of initial planning for Operation Comet. When 21st Army Group expanded Comet on 8 September and eliminated the 52d from the operation, SFHQ attached CLARENCE to the U.S. 82d Airborne Division, which had been involved in the fighting at Normandy and the hedgerow fighting and now would participate in Market Garden. (1) Jedburghs assigned to team CLARENCE included the team leader, Captain Arie D. "Harry" Bestebreurtje (Royal Netherlands Army), Lieutenant George M. Verhaeghe (U.S. Army), and Technical Sergeant Willard W. "Bud" Beynon (U.S. Army). (2)

The Dutch Country Section initially briefed these men in early September before the First Allied Airborne Army finalized Market Garden details. Their missions for

Market Garden remained unchanged from Comet. The team was to provide liaison between the 82d Airborne Division and the local population and to provide an additional communications link back to SFHQ in London. Once on the ground, the team would advise the commander on resistance capabilities and to coordinate with local resistance groups for execution of these capabilities. The Dutch Country Section provided CLARENCE with lists of leaders and meeting locations for Dutch resistance organizations in the field. Captain Bestebreurtje, whose home town, Nijmegen, was one of the tactical objectives of the 82d Airborne Division, knew some of these individuals, and provided an inherent advantage to the team in organizing and directing the Dutch underground. Prior to the team's departure for the 82d Airborne Division HQ, SFHQ also issued the team 5000 guilders and one Jedburgh W/T. (3)

The FAAA had briefed the Market Garden plan to its major subordinate commands at 1800 hours, 10 September. Captain Bestebreurtje reported to the 82d Airborne Division HQ on 11 September at 0800 hours, and immediately began to assist the staff in planning the operation. Captain Bestebreurtje provided significant information on the terrain, local populace and underground organizations. (4)

Deployment and Initial Actions

The 82d Airborne Division manifested Sergeant Beynon separately from his officers for the flight to Holland. Captain Bestebreurtje and Lieutenant Verhaeghe accompanied Brigadier General John Gavin, the Commanding General of the division, in the first plane of the division's assault, and Beynon was in Plane 3 with the team's equipment and radios. The planes took off from bases around Grantham, Lincolnshire and encountered heavy flak enroute. All members of CLARENCE jumped safely with the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment in C47s, but the team's equipment was lost. Instead of repacking the three equipment panniers and attaching them to the wings of the plane so they could be dropped simultaneously with Beynon's stick, the IX Troop Carrier Command chose to drop the equipment from the door before the stick jumped. As a result, the equipment landed in the Reichswald forest in Germany and was never recovered. (5)

The 82d Airborne Division dropped accurately over its drop zones and achieved complete surprise. (6) Enemy opposition was light, although CLAUDE and the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment encountered some resistance on their DZ north of Groesbeek. Beynon and another paratrooper went off to the forest in an attempt to recover

the team's equipment, but quickly met automatic weapons fire and returned. (7)

CLARENCE was very successful in vetting and organizing members of the resistance. Within one hour after their drop, Captain Bestebreurtje had contacted the leader of the 80 man Groesbeek resistance movement, and assigned some of these individuals to the division's regiments as guides and interpreters. The Groesbeek resistance leader found Captain Bestebreurtje a phone and provided him the special code which enabled him to talk to underground leaders in Nijmegen and Arnhem. The resistance in Arnhem informed him that the British had landed safely and that all seemed to be going well. He relayed this news to General Gavin. (8)

Misfortune befell the team that first day. Lieutenant Verhaeghe was seriously wounded in the leg, and was evacuated to England the following day. Captain Bestebreurtje was wounded later that night. Although the division had captured the Grave Bridge southwest of Nijmegen and had secured a crossing over the Maas-Waal Canal in Heumen, the Germans still controlled the critical 1,960 foot long railroad bridge in the town Nijmegen. General Gavin ordered the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment to secure the southern approaches to this bridge, and

Resistance intelligence played a key role in this operation. The underground had reported to the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment's 1st Battalion that the detonating mechanism for destroying the bridge was installed in Nijmegen's main post office building. The units which received this information dispatched a platoon to the building, where engineers cut the wires and destroyed the detonating controls. Captain Bestebreurtje, who accompanied the regiment's 1st Battalion in an attempt to contact leaders of the Nijmegen resistance, was wounded in a firefight in the streets. Despite injuries to his left hand, elbow, and right index finger, Captain Bestebreurtje continued to perform his duties. (9)

By 18 September CLARENCE had organized approximately 600 members of the underground for military duties. Some, armed with German weapons, were already guarding German prisoners captured at Groesbeek. One of the first orders General Gavin had issued upon landing was that his headquarters provide arms and explosives to resistance groups. He assigned CLARENCE the responsibility of vetting members and arming them with the weapons of fallen Americans. Gavin recommended that these groups prevent the destruction of the Nijmegen bridges by guarding the approaches and cutting any wires leading to the

structures. Thus, early on in the 82d Airborne Division area, these enthusiastic, armed resistance personnel were fighting alongside the American paratroopers. (10)

Actions: 18 September-22 September

During the early morning hours on 18 September (D+1), members of the Dutch underground in Arnhem reported through their telephone network that Panzer divisions were overwhelming the British 1st Airborne Division. A member of the Nijmegen resistance who had received this call passed the report to Captain Bestebreurtje, who relayed it to division headquarters. It was the first message out of Arnhem to alert the advance corps HQ that the Red Devils' mission was in jeopardy. (11) CLARENCE immediately contacted EDWARD from the telephone switch center in Nijmegen using this network, and relayed the Arnhem news as well as dispositions of German troops defending the railway and highway bridges across the Waal River. EDWARD used this phone network to advantage and directly contacted 1st Airborne Division staff the following day, relaying information between the latter and Corps. (12)

In conjunction with EDWARD on 19 September, CLARENCE held a meeting of resistance leaders from the district of Nijmegen, and organized resistance actions to

support the 82d Airborne Division's assault on the massive bridge across the Waal. EDWARD reported to SFHQ that these groups originated from Malden, Heumen, Overasselt, and Mook and numbered 290 men. (13) By the end of D+2, CLARENCE employed a total of 800 volunteers, some of whom were armed. (14)

On D+3, the 82d Airborne Division captured the northern end of the railway bridge across the Waal. The Guards Armored Division, which had linked up with the "All American Division" the day before, supported this daylight operation. (15) The Germans attempted to blow the bridge, but their emplaced demolition charges failed to explode. Many Dutch believe that James Van Hoof, a member of the local underground, saved this main crossing. Captain Bestebreurtje had recruited Van Hoof on 18 September, and dispatched him to Nijmegen on 18 September to act as a guide for forward 82d Airborne Division units. Van Hoof may have infiltrated German lines on his own and severed the detonating lines leading to the charges on the bridge. (16)

The advance corps HQ moved to Nijmegen on D+3, simplifying coordination between CLARENCE and EDWARD. At the end of this day, a platoon of U.S. paratroopers averted Sergeant Beynon from driving into a minefield. Beynon, who

was enroute to corps HQ, temporarily joined this platoon. While Beynon was with them, the platoon repelled two German crossing attempts along the canal at Mook. (17)

CLARENCE's coordination with the Dutch resistance continued to achieve excellent results on D+4 and D+5. On 21 September CLARENCE established an information center in the Nijmegen power station that used underground telephone lines to communicate with forces in Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, The Hague, Arnhem, Elst, Geertruidenberg, and Zwolle. This makeshift communications center supplied such a plethora of valuable operational intelligence across Holland that XXX Corps assumed control of it the following day. (18)

On 22 September XXX Corps assumed control of the town of Nijmegen and conferred with EDWARD on the status of resistance forces in the area. In coordination with EDWARD, CLARENCE organized an armed resistance force of 300 men to eliminate isolated pockets of enemy resistance around Nijmegen. XXX Corps later countermanded this effort, citing corps policy, which prevented arming large resistance groups that did not belong to the country's military forces. (19)

Organization of Resistance: 23 September-30 September

For the next nine days CLARENCE continued to work with the Dutch underground in the 82d Airborne Division area of operations. The team employed its most reliable resistance members as guides and guards for Nijmegen. It also made contact with small communities outside of Nijmegen which had their own resistance group. By 26 September CLARENCE had organized two companies for reconnaissance and direct action missions, but had inadequate stores of arms and ammunition to support their operations. CLARENCE's situation contrasted to that of EDWARD's, which reported that its resistance groups were fully armed. (20)

Communications improved for CLARENCE from 22 September until the end of their mission. Sergeant Beynon borrowed EDWARD's B-2 set to request another radio from SFHQ. Although SFHQ never supplied a W/T set, CLARENCE retained EDWARD'S set when the headquarters mission exfiltrated on 27 September. (21)

Termination of Mission and Summary of Activities

Team CLARENCE continued to operate out of Nijmegen until the end of September, when it requested and received permission from General Gavin to resquip in London under

the condition that it return to the 82d Airborne Division for continued work with the resistance. Sergeant Beynon returned to England on 1 October, refitted, and then flew back to the continent two days later. Captain Bestebreurtje remained in Holland, and worked out of Prince Bernhard's HQ until Beynon's return. CLARENCE renewed operations as team STANLEY II. (22)

Team CLARENCE accomplished all of its missions with the resistance and won the admiration of the commander and staff for their battlefield contributions to the success of the 82d Airborne Division in Operation Market Garden. CLARENCE's headquarters was usually with the advance elements of the 82d Airborne Division in order to contact Dutch Resistance forces. Because Captain Bestebreurtje's knowledge of the area was so extensive, the team contacted and organized approximately 1,000 men in the resistance during its time on the ground. Bestebreurtje's numerous contacts assisted team EDWARD, which operated in the vicinity and also enjoyed great success in these same tasks. (23)

CLARENCE provided significant intelligence to their division headquarters. Through the underground telephone network, the team was the first unit to receive word on the desperate plight of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.

CLARENCE's contacts and knowledge of this system enabled EDWARD to maintain direct contact with the 1st Division staff and to provide the corps with continuous situation reports on Arnhem when wireless communications were erratic and unpredictable. CLARENCE greatly expanded this capability when it established its makeshift communication center in the Nijmegen power plant. This center had telephone contact with virtually all major resistance forces in Holland, and yielded tremendous amounts of intelligence to XXX Corps and Second Army, which staffed the facility after Nijmegen's reversion to XXX Corps control.

Captain Bestebreurtje became somewhat of a legend during the opening days of the battle around Nijmegen. He saved General Gavin's life almost immediately after the drop. Minutes after General Gavin and he had landed near Groesbeek village, they became involved in a firefight during which Captain Bestebreurtje shot a German machine gunner through the head. (24) Bestebreurtje's organizational capabilities astounded the division, whose units quickly received Dutch guides fighting along side them and providing critical intelligence. Bestebreurtje gained the respect of the division staff when he continued to fight despite his wounds. According to Sergeant Beynon,

"His coolness under fire was the talk of the Division."

(25) Gavin considered Bestebreurtje so valuable that he made him promise to return to the division after SFHQ had debriefed in England.

Team CLARENCE enjoyed great operational success with the Dutch resistance in supporting the Division and in collecting intelligence, but it experienced some problems. The team had no radio communications, and had to rely on EDWARD to relay their reports back to London. Despite several requests, SFHQ could not resupply the team with a new man because of the persistent bad weather or the loss of resupply aircraft to German flak. After EDWARD relinquished its B-2 set, Sergeant Beynon had excellent communications until British tank radios interfered with his assigned frequencies. (26)

CHAPTER EIGHT

ENDNOTES

1. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAEF G3 Division OPNS "A," File Number 17104, "Operation Linnet." Amendment No 1 to SFHQ Preliminary Instructions, Operation "Linnet", MUS/1501/1877, 30 August 1944, pp. i-ii.; National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAEF G3 Division Airborne Section File Number 24571, "Operation Market." SFHQ Instruction No 1 to Operation Comet, MUS/1501/1914, 7 September 1944; and Amendment No 1 to SFHQ Instruction No 1 to Operation Comet, MUS/1501/1914, 10 September 1944.

2. Team CLARENCE Report, p. 1.

Captain Arie Bestebreurtje was an Olympic speed skating champion before the war. He became a Dutch commando and volunteered for Jedburgh duty in 1943. After Market Garden, Bestebreurtje remained in Holland and, as part of team STANLEY II, worked with Prince Bernhard's HQ. He later redeployed to Holland on 4-5 April 1945 as part of Jedburgh team DICING. This team dropped with the 3rd and 4th French Regiments in the Assen area to coordinate Dutch resistance operations. Captain Bestebreurtje was injured on the drop. He survived the war, emigrated to the United States, and became a church minister in Charlottesville, Virginia. Several years ago, he was ice skating on a canal near his home, fell through the ice, and drowned; Letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1980 to the author and letter from Gervase Cowell of 14 February 1980 to the author.

Beynon later deployed with a Jedburgh team to the China-Burma-India-theater. Willard "Bud" Beynon and George Verhaeghe both survived the war. Beynon, now retired, became a officer with the Scranton, Pennsylvania police department. He still resides there. Verhaeghe, also retired, lives in South Bend, Indiana; Letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1980 to the author and letter from Bob Baird of 21 November 1989 to the author.

3. Team CLARENCE Report, p. 1.

4. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAEF G3 Division Airborne Section File Number 24571, "Operation Market." HQ 82d Airborne Division, Office of Division Commander, "Lessons of Operation Market," 3 December 1944 (Division After Action report), p. 1.

5. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 228, War Diaries of the London Office, Special Operations: Boxes 17-30. OSS/London War Diaries, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July, August, September 1944, Operations Team CLARENCE. Technical Sergeant Willard Beynon. Untitled after action report attached to Team CLARENCE Report (Hereafter referred to as Beynon CLARENCE Report), p. 1.

6. FAAA Report, p. 7.

7. Beynon CLARENCE Report, p. 1.; and FAAA Report, p. 7.

8. Beynon CLARENCE Report, p. 1; and Powell, The Devil's Birthday, p. 101.

Powell mentions that the Nijmegen resistance used the separate telephone networks connecting the area's power and waterway installations. Captain Bestebreurtje exploited this for additional intelligence, establishing his HQ at the Nijmegen power station. See endnote # 18. Powell, p. 103.

9. Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, pp. 287-288.

Several days later, doctors told Bestebreurtje that they would have to amputate his wounded finger. He refused and kept the finger. Verhaeghe walks stiff legged as a result of his wounds suffered in Market Garden. Ryan, p. 288 and letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1989 to the author.

10. Beynon CLARENCE Report, p. 1; Powell, pp. 101-102; and Ryan, p. 444.

11. Ryan, p. 335.

12. Team EDWARD Report, pp. 10-11.

13. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

14. Team CLARENCE Report, p. 1.

15. FAAA Report, p. 11.

16. Ryan, p. 474. In 1949 a Dutch commission investigated this story and determined that Van Hoof did cut some lines. The detonating lines and demolition charges were on the left side of the Waal, and some historians believe the Germans surely would have detected Van Hoof on the bridge attempting to sever these lines. The commission could not confirm if the lines Van Hoof sabotaged in fact saved the bridge.

17. Beynon CLARENCE Report, p. 2.

18. Team EDWARD Report, pp. 4, 12. Second Army eventually commandeered this center, establishing a C3I center manned by officers from the 21st Army Group, Second Army, XXX Corps, a Dutch Liaison officer, and an interpreter.

19. FAAA Report, p. 14; and Team EDWARD Report, pp. 12-13.

20. Team CLARENCE Report, p. 2.

21. Beynon CLARENCE Report, p. 1; and Team EDWARD Report, pp. 8, 14.


22. Beynon CLARENCE Report, p. 2 and letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1989 to the author.

23. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

24. Powell, p. 101.

25. Beynon CLARENCE Report, p. 2.

26. Beynon CLARENCE Report, p. 1.



CHAPTER NINE

TEAM STANLEY II

"... My military knowledge was learned in a practical way by reading and by discussions with my officers. I depended on my staff, who were very well qualified."

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands

Assigned Missions

Sergeant Beynon remained in London for approximately 48 hours, and returned to Holland on 3 October with Captain Peter Vickery, a British Jedburgh who replaced the wounded George Verhaeghe. Captain Bestebreurtje, who had remained in country and was now receiving orders directly from Prince Bernhard's HQ, linked up with these men in the Arnhem-Nijmegen area to form team STANLEY II. STANLEY II's mission differed greatly from CLARENCE's earlier mission to organize underground and local populace support for the 82d Airborne Division. SFHQ, in coordination with Prince Bernhard's HQ, directed CLARENCE to train resistance groups into functional military organizations that could perform conventional missions when operating with Allied forces. (1)

Once assembled, STANLEY II reported to Prince Bernhard's Headquarters. Bernhard decided to retain the team under his command to temporarily work in the Nijmegen area. Under this arrangement, STANLEY II worked directly for Bernhard and reported their operations to him as well as to SFHQ. In addition, Captain Bestebreurtje, who knew the Prince well, reported to his headquarters in The Hague every two weeks to deliver a situation update. (2)

Captain Vickery's Actions

Upon Captain Vickery's arrival in Nijmegen, Captain Bestebreurtje assigned him responsibility for commanding and arming OD resistance groups in the Leeuwen, Wamel, Dreumel, and Alphen areas. Establishing his headquarters at Leeuwen, Captain Vickery over the course of four weeks organized and armed two OD groups totalling 150 men. Despite numerous German harassing raids into this area, Vickery's losses were light, although on 19 October he was wounded by mortar fire.

By the end of the month, Vickery had organized and formed volunteers from the resistance into a 185 man Stoottrophen company. Since the company had no reserve and was responsible for 24 hour local security, training was difficult. This company stiffened the defense of the

Leeuwen and Wamel areas and permitted the OD there to perform guard missions along the dyke and population control duties in the towns. The OD, commanded by a Dr. Van Hoher, numbered approximately 140 men and remained responsible for the Alphen and Dreumel areas. (3)

In addition to commanding a Stoottrophen company and coordinating resistance operations, Captain Vickery assumed control of covert transport missions of men and materiel across the Waal and through German lines. Inherent in this responsibility was infiltrating and exfiltrating SOE sponsored agents over the Waal to evacuate paratroopers of the 1st Airborne Division still hiding in the vicinity of Arnhem. To coordinate these operations, Captain Vickery communicated via the secret underground telephone network to three members of the Dutch Intelligence service working directly for him on the other side of the Waal in Tiel. Eventually he began smuggling arms across the river via canoes to the resistance. These operations were successful until the end of November. Captain Vickery then organized another crossing area near Bies Bosch with the local OD leader. (4)

The 8th Armored Brigade, commanded by Brigadier E. Prior-Palmer, moved into Vickery's area during the third week in October. His Dutch intelligence operatives

reported enemy troop, artillery and HQ dispositions, and Captain Vickery acted as a forward OP for medium artillery units of the 8th Armored Brigade, which destroyed the railway bridge northwest of Tiel and other targets. Brigadier Prior-Palmer, who had known Vickery at Sandhurst, took a great interest in the Dutch, and had his 8th Armored Brigade supply the Stoottrophen and OD with food, medical care and some military equipment. In coordination with Captain Vickery, the brigade trained the Stoottrophen on heavy weapons, mortars, patrolling, and first aid. The Dutch immediately responded, and, according to Vickery, "started to behave more like soldiers." (5)

The 8th Armored Brigade fully integrated Captain Vickery's Stoottrophen into their defense plans. The brigadier ordered Vickery to construct a series of defensive strong points along the Waal stretching six kilometers from Dreumel to Leeuwen. Vickery stationed six to eight men at each post, but ammunition was a problem due to the disparity of weapons. The posts engaged in firefights with German patrols throughout the latter weeks in October and all of November. (6)

At the end of November, the Canadian 7th Armored Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Bingham and reinforced by Major General MacMillan's 49th Armored

Division, replaced the 8th Armored Brigade in the Leeuwen area. Stoottrophen Company Number 8, which had trained under Dutch officers in England and was fully equipped, relieved Captain Vickery's Stoottrophen company, which withdrew from the line. The 49th Recce Regiment of the 49th Division assumed control of Company Number 8, and the 7th Recce Regiment of the Canadian 7th Brigade directed activities of the OD in Dreumel.

The Canadians modified Vickery's defensive positions along the Waal, but were surprised at the efficiency of the Stoottrophen and OD groups. During December, Captain Vickery formed another company of Stoottrophen from OD volunteers in the Dreumel area. Stoottrophen Number 8 was responsible for the upper Leeuwen and the new company, Number 7, became responsible for the line along Wamel, Dreumel, and Alphen. (7)

The 49th Division was very generous with its stores and Captain Vickery eventually equipped his new company with everything they needed. The 49th also trained Vickery's men on minelaying, marksmanship, and small unit tactics.

Captain Bestebreurtje and Sergeant Beynon's Actions

Vickery's mission concluded on 25 January.

Throughout his deployment he reported to Captain Bestebreurtje once a week for instructions. Captain Bestebreurtje and Sergeant Beynon had continued to operate out of Nijmegen. They initially organized and armed resistance forces in the Oxsinys, Wihseej, Druten, and Weurt areas. By 16 October STANLEY II had settled infighting between resistance groups, and had established training centers in Wydhen, Hexpen, and Nijmegen. Their groups formed part of the static defensive line along the Waal Canal from Dreumel to Nijmegen. (Vickery's units occupied the left flank of this line from Dreumel to Alphen.) At the end of October, Captain Bestebreurtje had organized his own Stoottrophen company in Nijmegen, and had several other companies in training.

Throughout October, the Dutch underground telephone network continued to report significant enemy intelligence data to Captain Bestebreurtje from cities still occupied by the Germans. STANLEY II also attempted to provide assistance to the stranded paratroopers and citizens in the Arnhem area. They organized 80 men at Wyden and Anvaldenheu to smuggle arms across the Lek and Waal canals to 1st Airborne Division personnel still behind enemy

lines. They requested SFHQ to arrange a drop of food and medical supplies north of Arnhem for Dutch civilians, but London denied this request, citing higher air supply priorities. (8)

Sergeant Beynon returned to England on 4 November and Captain Bestebreurtje remained behind in Holland, where he continued to train resistance groups and perform missions for both Prince Bernhard and SFHQ until April 1945. (9)

Summary of Activities and Conclusions

Team STANLEY II was quite successful in arming, organizing and training resistance groups. Both officers coordinated the work of disparate resistance groups in their area of operations and eventually formed some of their volunteers into proficient combat units. Captains Vickery and Bestebreurtje organized at least five Stoottrophen companies in the last three months of 1944, which defended stretches of the Waal Canal in support of Allied forces. Both British, American, and Canadian forces in the area were impressed with the training and professionalism of these companies, which supported their operations. Moreover, STANLEY II continued to obtain significant information from their contacts behind German

lines, which proved very useful to the advancing 21st Army Group. (10)

Communications to SFHQ and to Prince Bernhard's HQ were excellent. Sergeant Beynon was in contact with SFHQ's home station in London the entire five weeks he was on the ground. Captain Bostebreurtje's bi-weekly visits to Prince Bernhard ensured excellent coordination and support. (11)

CHAPTER NINE

ENDNOTES

1. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 226, War Diaries of the London Office, Special Operations: Boxes 17-30. OSS/London War Diaries, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July, August, September 1944, Operations Team STANLEY II (Hereafter referred to as Team STANLEY Report), p. 1. SFHQ dispatched the team with a B-2 set and a Jedburgh set and issued them 10,000 Dutch Guilders and 250,000 Belgian Francs.


During their training at Milton Hall, Captain Vickery and Sergeant Willard "Bud" Beynon formed a Jedburgh team, and prepared for deployment to France. Lieutenant Verhaeghe, however, approached Beynon, and convinced him to break off the "engagement" and to go to Holland as part of Captain Bestebreurtje's team. Although neither report written by Beynon or Vickery discusses the details of their deployment to Holland, it is assumed they traveled together on the same plane and eventually linked up with Captain Bestebreurtje, who had remained behind in Holland. Letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1989 to the author and telephone conversation between Major John Olsted (ret.) and the author of 18 April 1990.

2. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 226, War Diaries of the London Office, Special Operations: Boxes 17-30. OSS/London War Diaries, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July, August, September 1944, Operations Team STANLEY II. Technical Sergeant Willard Beynon, untitled after action report attached to Team STANLEY II Report (Cited hereafter as Beynon STANLEY Report.), p. 1.

3. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 226, War Diaries of the London Office, Special Operations: Boxes 17-30. OSS/London War Diaries, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July, August, September 1944, Operations Team STANLEY II Report. Captain Peter Vickery, untitled after action report attached to Team STANLEY II Report (Cited hereafter as Vickery STANLEY Report.), pp. 1-2. Prince Bernhard took great interest in STANLEY II's mission. His

HQ supplied STANLEY's forces with British and German weapons.

4. Ibid. pp. 1, 4.
5. Ibid., pp. 2-3. This equipment included binoculars, mortars, and maps.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., pp. 3-5.
8. Team STANLEY Report, pp. 1-2.
9. Beynon STANLEY Report, p. 1.
10. Ibid., p. 1.
11. Ibid., p. 1.



CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSIONS

"My country can never again afford
the luxury of another Montgomery success."

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands
in a comment to Cornelius Ryan

Contrasts in Missions

The six Jedburgh teams deployed to support Operation Market Garden had varying degrees of success. The teams' missions differed greatly. DUDLEY, deployed almost a week before Market Garden, conducted clandestine operations in a heavily occupied area. Their mission was along the lines of Jedburgh teams previously deployed to France. The DLM teams, CLARENCE, CLAUDE, DANIEL II, and EDWARD, operated as both SF Detachments and Jedburgh teams. Their mission was highly unusual, and prosecuted in a series of fast moving battles that demanded great initiative and agility. STANLEY II's mission was also unusual in that the team worked directly for Prince Bernhard with responsibilities similar to today's SOF support for Foreign Internal Defense. In evaluating the role of all of Jedburgh teams in support of Operation

Market Garden, it is important first to analyze the terrain and political environment in which these six teams fought.

Limiting Aspects of Terrain

The employment of Jedburgh teams in the Netherlands differed from those in France in several important respects. The flat and densely populated Dutch countryside was ill suited to resistance operations on a large scale, and lacked the mountains necessary for training and concealment. There was no Maquis due to the nature of the terrain and the limited area of operations. (1) SFHQ drops over Holland were very dangerous because of the low horizon and wide visibility of the country's flat landscape. During the months before Market Garden, when SOE resumed infiltrating agents and supplies to the resistance in Holland, heavy concentrations of German troops deployed air guards each night to detect such clandestine operations, adding to the danger. (2) As a result, it was difficult for the Dutch underground to conduct operations unobserved, and opportunities for guerilla action were far fewer than in France. (3)

The nature of the terrain and the German presence in Holland created many new problems for SFHQ planners and the Jedburgh teams. A Jedburgh team attempting to operate

40 miles or more behind German lines would undertake all missions under the watchful eye of the German Wehrmacht, Gestapo, SD, as well as Dutch collaborators connected to the Landwacht and the NSB. For some situations in Holland, a Jedburgh team could perform a protective role or an intelligence collection mission, but opportunities to harass enemy troop movements were far fewer and more hazardous. Thus, Jedburgh missions in Holland were inherently clandestine, and the traditional Milton Hall scenario of Allied officers dropping in uniform was a source of danger to the underground rather than an impetus as in France. (4) This explains why DUDLEY immediately exchanged their uniforms for civilian clothes. For DUDLEY and members of the underground operating in such an environment, the risk of compromise was very great and survival was a day to day proposition. The danger of their work is manifested in DUDLEY's constant struggle to evade German and Dutch security forces, and, ultimately, in the deaths of two of its members.

Status of the Dutch Resistance

The Dutch resistance itself was highly suspect. Only at the end of 1943 did SOE discover that the Germans had completely penetrated its agent network in Holland in

Operation "NORD POL." With 50 agents lost and an entire covert operation compromised, those few British officers and officials privy to such matters developed a deep distrust of the Dutch resistance. The Allies did not begin dropping small numbers of agents into Holland again until after the invasion of Normandy. Only as the British Second Army approached the Dutch frontier at the beginning of September and it seemed probable that Holland would fall as easily as Belgium had done, did SFHQ parachute agents in with weapons and equipment.

"NORD POL" hindered Allied intelligence collection. SFHQ had inadequate information on the Dutch resistance in the late summer of 1944. SFHQ attempted to rectify this problem by dispatching agents to determine the dependability and fighting spirit of the myriad groups in the Dutch provinces. Although these groups had tremendous enthusiasm, they were poorly organized and equipped. SFHQ had provided them minimal support for almost ten months.

(5)

SFHQ's intelligence reports in August 1944 mention the diversity of resistance groups in Holland but fail to discuss their disunity and political problems. It is doubtful that SFHQ realized the discord in the Dutch underground, which was riddled by competing regional

groups, political infighting between left and right factions, and widespread parochialism among the provinces. The usual political split between left and right was missing in western Holland during the war, however, and the communist groups were confined largely to the industrialized eastern provinces. Coordination between the various competing groups was rare. The inherent dangers for partisans moving through numerous Wehrmacht checkpoints and evading Gestapo and SD counterintelligence operations precluded a nationally organized and unified effort. In the Twente area, for example, resistance groups operated independently because they simply did not know the others existence. A partisan dealt with the pressures of occupation in his own circle, and was usually totally unaware of other people's resistance activities. (6)

As planning for Market Garden intensified, SFHQ did not have an adequate network of agents in Holland. By September, however, it was too late for the Dutch Country Section to develop an accurate picture of the complicated Dutch resistance for Operation Market Garden or to dispatch sufficient numbers of Jedburgh teams which could have worked with resistance groups to develop this unity of effort. Despite Prince Bernhard's call for a united resistance on 11 September, the competing groups never

coalesced into a unified effort, and, as a result, Jedburgh teams faced numerous coordination problems once on the ground.

Unusual Nature of Market Garden Missions

The enemy and resistance situations in Holland necessitated modifications to the Jedburgh mission, and plans for Market Garden further refined SFHQ's employment of its Jedburgh teams. The unique Market Garden mission demanded a flexible, responsive SFHQ support. The DLM concept initially developed for Operations Linnet I and II and refined for Operation Comet was unlike previous Jedburgh missions. For the first time, Jedburgh teams were to drop into an ongoing battle and immediately attempt to contact and organize resistance support for Allied Forces fighting at that same time in the fields right along side the resistance. The teams would have no time once on the ground to develop contacts or to slowly organize and train the underground. Their liaison operations had an urgency about them which French Jedburgh teams did not experience. The resistance groups they contacted and hastily organized were immediately attached to airborne infantry as guards, guides, and interpreters.

The Dutch Liaison sub-missions were the first Jedburgh teams to act as SF Detachments for a conventional division. Although they performed standard missions such as coordinating the actions of resistance groups and providing underground intelligence, these teams had the additional responsibility of working for their respective division commander on the ground. The Jedburghs organized the missions of the resistance in accordance with the instructions of their assigned commanders, and often performed additional missions at their direction (e.g. Major Wilson guarding the prisoners at Utrecht when the 101st Airborne Division had no one else available). In this way, Jedburgh teams functioned more like SF Detachments than actual operational teams on the ground.

The importance SFHQ stressed on communications to all DLM teams reinforced this SF detachment concept. The teams updated SFHQ on their progress with resistance forces in their areas of operation and serve as a back up link to apprise London of the tactical situation of their respective airborne units. Inherent in this mission was EDWARD's coordination of resistance operations for the entire airborne corps Headquarters. For the first time, a Jedburgh team made a concerted effort to command and control subordinate Jedburgh missions and to coordinate the

actions of resistance movements over a large area of responsibility.

Preparation of Teams for Missions

SFHQ prepared these teams for their missions in much the same way as it dispatched the French Jedburgh teams. The Dutch Country Section failed to consider the peculiarities of the Dutch underground movement and the special requirements of the terrain. This caused problems for the teams once on the ground. As previously mentioned, the decision to send DUDLEY in uniform was a mistake. The team changed into civilian clothes immediately upon their arrival.

Although the teams complimented the Dutch Country Section on their thorough briefings, they were actually incomplete. The Dutch Country Section did not have adequate intelligence on the Dutch resistance groups or a complete understanding of the widespread divisions between the different resistance factions to prepare a detailed briefing. DUDLEY dropped to an RVV organization that the SFHQ thought extremely reliable. However, this organization was extremely uncooperative, and caused DUDLEY numerous coordination problems over the next few months. Lieutenant Knottenbelt, attached to team CLAUDE, also noted

this in his after action report. Knottenbelt found it extremely difficult to establish the identities of underground members because he lacked information on the local resistance leaders. He stated that the mission was standard liaison duty, which was more applicable to a

regular liaison mission fully equipped with the necessary information to enable them to make a direct approach to the local Resistance Leaders. (7)

Relationship of Attached Liaison Officers to the Teams

The officers attached to the teams may have created some problems once they deployed. Although SFHQ established the precedent of attaching officers and agents to French Jedburgh teams that summer, Jedburgh training and an intuitive understanding of the Dutch resistance were required in dealing with the myriad problems posed by the competing resistance factions. SFHQ had attached three Dutch liaison officers (Lieutenant M.J. Knottenbelt to CLAUDE, Lieutenant DuBois and Sergeant Fokker to DANIEL II) and one British liaison officer (Captain R. Mills to EDWARD) to the DLM before their attachment to the airborne divisions. While some acted as interpreters or liaison officers for the teams and their respective units, their lack of Jedburgh experience put them at an immediate disadvantage in dealing with the resistance in the fast

moving tactical situation at Market Garden. Lieutenant DuBois provided some problems for Major Wilson of team DANIEL II. Although there are no current references or accounts available to explain DuBois' actions and why they frustrated Major Wilson, it may be assumed that DuBois had difficulty that first week on the ground in coordinating resistance actions to Wilson's satisfaction. (8)

The Market Garden Tactical Situation

The desperate situation at Market Garden is another consideration in evaluating the success of the teams. The Dutch Liaison Mission performed their missions as best they could under trying circumstances. Very often they did not have the time or personnel to direct the movements of the Dutch underground. CLAUDE and DANIEL II, for example, could not effectively accomplish their mission with the resistance or communicate back to SFHQ in London because of the exigencies of their own tactical situation. These teams fought alongside their attached units in an incessant struggle to repel numerous German attacks and raids. Their courage and Jedburgh training enabled them to survive in most cases, but the members of these teams did not have the time or the resources to adequately support their higher headquarters as envisioned by SFHQ.

Results of Coordination with the Dutch Underground

Thus, the Jedburgh teams which participated in Operation Market Garden achieved mixed results. EDWARD and CLARENCE enjoyed great success in coordinating activities of local resistance groups in support of the airborne divisions. The Dutch underground provided invaluable intelligence to these teams when erratic communications in the airborne corps prevented immediate situation updates--especially in Arnhem, where the Red Devils' plight was so desperate. Captain Bestebreurtje was instrumental in providing this intelligence and coordinating with the resistance. His knowledge of the terrain and the people of his native Nijmegen was a tremendous asset to the 82d Airborne Division and the Dutch Liaison Mission as a whole. Captain Bestebreurtje was largely responsible for organizing the resistance around Nijmegen, for establishing the intelligence/communications center at the city's power plant, and for tying in the secret Dutch underground telephone network to team EDWARD and corps headquarters. All of these accomplishments contributed the success of the 82d Airborne Division and informed the corps of 1st Airborne Division's plight at Arnhem.

The success of the Jedburgh teams in the Dutch Liaison Mission is linked to the results their respective

Divisions had in working with the Dutch underground. The greatest value of the resistance to both the 82d Airborne Division, and, to a lesser extent, the 101st Airborne Division, was intelligence collection. Both American divisions lacked ground reconnaissance units, and without on-call aerial reconnaissance, the Dutch resistance forces assigned by the Jedburgh teams became excellent intelligence collectors. In addition, both divisions made good use of resistance guides, who led units through strange streets and wooded paths to their tactical objectives. General Gavin of the 82d Airborne Division commented: "The {the Dutch} proved to be among the bravest and most patriotic people we had liberated." (9)

The British experience with the Dutch resistance was quite different than their American counterparts. The advance corps HQ received a steady volume of intelligence data from Arnhem because it capitalized on the resistance operated telephone network. The Dutch people also assisted in building an airfield at DeKluis and in moving some of their equipment from their various headquarters locations throughout the operation. The British 1st Airborne Division situation was different, due in part to the tactical situation in Arnhem and the fate of team CLAUDE, which lost its radios and two men in the ensuing struggle

to survive continuous German attacks. Although members of the underground attached themselves at one time or another to 1st Airborne Division units and headquarters, the British did not exploit resistance forces. It is known that Lieutenant Colonel Frost was told not to trust the Dutch, and this warning may have influenced the rest of the 1st Brigade as well. Certainly, the British were cognizant that German sympathizers hid within the enthusiastic crowds of liberated Dutch, and this may have also effected their decision not to use Dutch. (10)

The British security concerns may also explain their failure to exploit the Dutch telephone network, which Captain Bestebreurtje and team EDWARD used so effectively in the Nijmegen area. While use of civilian circuits had not been previously considered in Market Garden planning for security purposes, the abysmal state of the 1st Airborne Division communications in Arnhem required some innovation and flexibility to redress, and the British lost yet another opportunity to use the Dutch underground to advantage. It was also unfortunate that British signal officers did not discover the separate and secure telephone system linking electric power and water supply systems from Nijmegen to Arnhem. Captain Bestebreurtje used this system

for his intelligence reports to the 82d Airborne Division on the situation at Arnhem. (11)

DUDLEY and STANLEY II's missions were markedly different than those teams comprising the Dutch Liaison Mission, and for that reason, their successes and failures cannot be analyzed in the same context as the DLM teams. DUDLEY'S mission most closely approximated the previous Jedburgh missions deployed to France. However, the team lived in constant danger of compromise because of the flat, heavily populated terrain and the large number of German forces in the area. Despite moving 15 times in a period of 70 days, the team managed to organize approximately 1,200 members of the underground and had arms in store for 3,800 more. This was a remarkable feat in a country where competing resistance groups were often at odds and Nazi sympathizers had penetrated several operations. Had the Allies been able to advance from Arnhem as planned, DUDLEY could have mobilized 12-15,000 men in the Overijssel area to assist. The intelligence the team acquired was not immediately useful for the Market Garden operation. However, had 21st Army Group been capable of liberating Holland in November and December of 1944, DUDLEY's contributions would have been quite significant.

Nevertheless, the team achieved excellent results in difficult conditions fraught with constant danger. (12)

Team STANLEY II's mission to organize and train Stoottrophen and OD in support of Allied conventional forces was unlike the tasks SFHQ assigned to the other DUTCH teams. In this mission, STANLEY trained resistance to perform conventional operations as regular forces, and received the support of Prince Bernhard's HQ at The Hague. The team had actual control of these forces in the line for the defense of the Waal canal. STANLEY II trained these resistance forces on standard Allied weaponry and soldier skills, and eventually formed them into conventional companies. This mission was very similar to today's modern Foreign Internal Defense mission that Special Operations Forces perform on mobile training missions. The difference is that STANLEY pioneered training techniques and saw the effectiveness of their training immediately in war. STANLEY enjoyed great success in this mission, having trained approximately five Stoottrophen companies and organizing the OD to supplement the rest of the defensive line along Waal.

Results as Communications Link for SFHQ

If the Dutch Liaison teams enjoyed mixed results in their efforts to coordinate the activities of resistance groups, they failed in their assigned mission to act as a backup communications link to London. Of the four teams which deployed as the Dutch Liaison Mission, three lost their radios. Jedburgh teams which deployed to France constantly had their radio sets destroyed on drops, and this problem was not resolved in early September when the SFHQ activated the DLM. (13) Their radio sets may have been state of the art in 1944, but they were heavy and fragile. As a result, only the headquarters mission EDWARD maintained communications with London, and this largely because it landed in a glider as opposed to jumping as did the other three teams. It is likely that if EDWARD had jumped, SFHQ would not have had any communications with the teams throughout the entire Market Garden operation. The communications equipment was fragile and SFHQ had not developed sufficient doctrine for deploying it out of aircraft.

Lessons Learned for Modern Day SOF Operations

There are numerous lessons learned from the Jedburgh role in Operation Market Garden that are

applicable to modern day SOF support to conventional operations. Certainly the 1943 Jedburgh concept is a blue print for U.S. armed service support to insurgent forces as outlined in FM 100-20. Jedburgh forces were directly involved with the recruitment, organization, and equipping of insurgent forces in a classical unconventional warfare campaign and in support of conventional forces during a major theater operation. They influenced resistance intelligence collection methods, developed their infrastructure, and trained them on sabotage, patrolling, and insertion techniques. Jedburgh teams were instrumental in coordinating with leaders of the underground for conventional force commanders, providing a unique liaison capability that is not discussed in detail in 100-20. (14)

SFHQ and the Jedburghs failed to accomplish certain aspects of their mission, however. It is these failures that are still relevant for study in developing proper procedures for modern day special operations support in insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. First, SFHQ inserted the Jedburghs too late. By accompanying the airborne forces on this mission, the teams did not have adequate time to fully organize resistance forces to perform their assigned tasks. Had the Jedburghs arrived earlier, more intelligence and larger numbers of resistance

forces would have been available for disposition by FAAA planners in London. Second, the division commanders did not have a full appreciation of what resistance forces could provide them in the way of support. Moreover, they had no familiarity with Jedburgh teams and their operations. Thus, the effectiveness of the teams was largely dependent on the flexibility and confidence of their commanders. This worked well in the case of CLARENCE. It was disastrous for CLAUDE and the British First Airborne Division at Arnhem.

Other failures included inappropriate doctrine, poor intelligence, and inadequate communications equipment. The terrain and enemy situation in the Netherlands necessitated a change in Jedburgh tactics. SFHQ should have deployed the teams earlier and in civilian clothes, which would have better prepared them for the contingencies of covert and clandestine operations. Jedburgh teams had inadequate intelligence on the resistance forces. Any special operations unit deploying behind enemy lines requires detailed intelligence on all facets of its operation. As a result of "NORD POL" and the subsequent British distrust of the Dutch underground, Jedburghs deployed without knowing the extent of the friction within the underground or the important leaders who could broker

power. Lastly, Jedburgh teams on the DLM had inadequate personnel to perform all the missions asked of them. To provide a rear link back to London, coordinate resistance operations over a 20 kilometer radius, and produce intelligence for both their division commanders and SFHQ in London required a much larger team. This is especially true when analyzed in the context of the intense series of battles fought over a week's time in Operation Market Garden. Although SFHQ attempted to obviate this problem by providing attachments, the teams encountered difficulty with some of these personnel and could have more effectively employed Jedburghs exfiltrated from France or elsewhere.

Would SFHQ's earlier deployment of the DLM teams have made a difference? Many teams in France wrote in their after action reports that an earlier deployment would have improved the success of their missions, yet SFHQ did not follow these suggestions in their planning for Market Garden. (15) Undoubtedly, an earlier deployment would have enabled the teams to establish contacts with the local resistance and prepare them for Market Garden. This was the purpose for team DUDLEY's earlier deployment and the results were excellent. Only after the Allied advance stalled and the Germans began their razzias and reprisals

against the Dutch population did DUDLEY's mission lose its effectiveness. Had the other teams of the DLM been deployed a week earlier, it is possible they also would have achieved similar results, and the results for the operation might have been different.

Affects on the Dutch Population

Market Garden's failure and the mixed results of Jedburgh operations in Holland weighed heavily on the Dutch population. The Dutch had initially expected to be liberated within days after the Allies had staged Market Garden. Their bold and overt actions against German forces had been a natural outpouring of confidence that the war would soon be over in the Netherlands. The defeat at Arnhem was a tremendous blow to the Dutch people, who now struggled to endure German SS and Gestapo reprisals. Major Olmsted wrote in his narrative:

...it seemed unbelievable that the Allies would not be in this area for over six months. After the first excitement caused by the airborne landings, hopes sagged as the weeks and months went by and reached a new low during the final preparation of and fighting of the Battle of the Bulge. (16)

CHAPTER TEN

ENDNOTES

1. Letter from Gervase Cowell of 14 February 1990 to the author, p. 9.
2. Olmsted, "Team 'DUDLEY' Eastern Europe, Fall 1944," p. 75.
3. Cowell, p. 9.
4. Ibid., p. 9.
5. Powell, The Devil's Birthday, pp. 99-100.
6. Powell, p. 101; Hilbrink, De Illegalen, p. 391.
7. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 3.
8. Team EDWARD Report, p. 5. It is possible that Wilson simply did not like DuBois. The Dutch lieutenant performed well in the latter stages of Market Garden, and redeployed in November to assist in the evacuation of 1st Airborne Division paratroopers through German lines to the Rhine. Major John Olmsted of team DUDLEY was one of these men.
9. Powell, p. 102.
10. Powell, p. 102; and Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, pp. 443-445.
11. Powell, p. 103.
12. Team DUDLEY Report, p. 7.
13. Lewis, "Jedburgh Operations in Support of 12th Army Group," pp. 62-63.
14. U.S. Army/U.S. Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Manual 2-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. (Final Draft; 7 March 1989), pp. 2-33-34.

15. Lewis, p. 61.

16. Olmsted, p. 48.

GLOSSARY

Abwehr	The Secret Military Intelligence Department of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (the German High Command), responsible for espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage service
Afu	Clandestine radio set operated by an agent
Agent	Specially trained individual dropped behind enemy lines to obtain information, commit acts of sabotage, and organize resistance.
Bevelhebber Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten	Commander, National/Internal forces. Prince Bernhard's Dutch designation following his appointment by SHAEF as the Commander of the Netherlands Forces (the Triangle)
BBO	The Dutch headquarters in London for sabotage and underground armed resistance in Holland. Worked under the auspices of SFHQ from 1944-1945
BBS	See Bevelhebber Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten
BI	The headquarters of the Dutch Secret Intelligence Service in London
B-2 Set	SOE designed radio provided to Jedburgh teams for extended communications back to London. This 30 watt device weighed 32 pounds when stored in its suitcase.
Binnenhof	The Dutch parliament Buildings at The Hague. Occupied during the war by the Chief of the SIPO and the SD
Bren Gun	British light machine gun ZGB30 adopted in 1934, a modification of the Czech Zb26 machine gun to fire .303 inch ammunition
Burgomaster	mayor or chief administrator of Dutch community
COSSAC	Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command (Western Europe)
C2	Plastic explosive used for demolitions

CSI	Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence
CP	Command Post
Crystal	Means of regulating the wave-length of radio transmissions
Dachshund	1943 SOE exercise to determine equipment requirements for Jedburgh teams
Dakota Operation	General code name for an air operation in which a Dakota or C-47 aircraft landed behind enemy lines to deliver or pick up men and materials
De Illegalen	Dutch word for the underground; resistance groups
DLM	Dutch Liaison Mission
Dutch Liaison Mission	The four Jedburgh teams which supported the Market Garden Operation
DZ	Drop zone; area designated for parachute landings
EMFFI	Etat Majeur Forces Francaises de l'Interieure (Headquarters of the French Forces of the Interior). Commanded by General Paul Koenig
ETO	European Theater of Operations
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
Eureka Marker	Radio navigational device used by the resistance and deployed agents on the ground to mark a drop zone for aerial drop of personnel or equipment. Ground operators transmitted signal letters to aircraft with their Eureka beacon (by varying frequency of the signal) which an aircraft radar air-ground instrument recorded

F.A.N.Y.	Female Auxiliary Nursing Yeomanry. SOE organization responsible for training Morse Code and encryption procedures to Jedburgh radio operators
FOP Albrect Group	Highly classified Dutch intelligence organization with resistance contacts throughout Holland
FFI	Forces Francaises de l'Interieure. French Forces of the Interior
F-Section	Section of the Western European Directorate of SFHQ entirely controlled by SOE/SO and operating independently of the FFI, which introduced and directed undercover agents into France.
FUSAG	First United States Army Group
G1	U.S. Army designation for personnel staff section
G2	U.S. Army designation for intelligence staff section
G3	U.S. Army designation for operations staff section
G4	U.S. Army designation for logistics staff section
G5	U.S. Army designation for civil affairs staff section
Garden	Code word for British Second Army operations support of the airborne forces.
Gestapo	Acronym for Die Geheime Staatspolizei, Nazi Germany's Secret State Police
Groen Polizei	Dutch organization which worked closely with the SS, SD, and Gestapo. Participated on razzia operations.
Jedburgh	British and American code name for specially trained three man team to work with resistance units behind enemy lines

Jed Set	SOE designed radio exclusively for Jedburgh use. This five watt device weighed 5.5 pounds and, when stored in a specially designed suitcase with its accessories, weighed a total of 8 pounds. Range: approximately 500 miles
Knockploegen	Dutch resistance groups (translation: knocking groups) which worked in conjunction with the LO, providing identity and ration cards for the underground. The KP also carried out some sabotage missions.
KP	Acronym for the Knockploegen groups
Ladellijke Organisatie	Dutch resistance organization (translation: National Organization) which safeguarded refugees and downed airmen sought by the Gestapo
Landwacht	NSB organization with duties similar to the German SD.
Lash	Code name for Jedburgh exercise, commencing 31 May 1944 and ending 8 June 1944. This required Jedburgh teams to contact a resistance group and direct its attack of enemy rail communications and other targets as indicated through W/T at a later time
Levee	Code name for joint SOE/SO command post exercise held in March 1944 in which the Americans acted as the SO staffs with the Field Armies and the British ran the control
LO	See Ladellijke Organisatie
LOCs	Lines of Communication
Luftwaffe	The German air force of World War II
LZ	Landing Zone
Manifest	To assign a load or individual to a particular aircraft for an airborne mission

Maquis	Also known as the Maquisards, French resistance fighters who took their name from the tough and thorny bush in Corsica
Market	Code word for the operations of the three airborne divisions
ME/65	Cover name for Milton Hall, Jedburgh training school in Peterborough, England
MI-5	British counterintelligence and security service
MI-6	The British secret intelligence service
MID	The Dutch Military Intelligence Section of SOE
Moffen	Dutch derogatory term for the Germans, especially those forces occupying the Netherlands
NSB	National-Sozialistische-Bewegung. The organization of the Dutch national socialists. The founder and leader Mussert was executed in the Netherlands after the war.
OD	See Orde Dienst
OKW	The German High Command
OP	Observation Post
ORDE DIENST	A widespread underground organization which operated in Holland during the war. It was composed principally of officials and former officers. SOE believed the Germans had penetrated this organization.
ORPO	Ordnungspolizei, or Regulating Police. The German force responsible in Holland between 1940 and 1945 for suppressing clandestine radio links.

OT	Organisation Todt. Nazi organization for construction of large building projects; e.g. autobahns, West Wall, Atlantic Wall, fortifications, airfields, etc.
OSS	Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. secret intelligence and operations service
OG	Operational Groups, OSS teams consisting of 4 officers and 30 enlisted men deployed in Brittany and Southern France to support the D-Day Invasion on missions of sabotage and guerilla fighting.
Pannier	Special bag designed for airborne drops
Raad Van Vertz	Otherwise known as the Council of the Resistance (RVV). Paramilitary Dutch resistance organization with factions throughout Holland
Radio Orange	The radio transmitter of the Dutch government in exile in London between 1940 and 1945.
Razzia	German forced labor and deportation of Dutch male population, employed in reprisals against Dutch populace for their support of Allies in Operation Market Garden.
RF-Section	Section of the Western European Directorate of SFHQ dealing with existing independent resistance groups which maintained liaison between BCRA and French resistance
RSHA	Reichsicherheitshauptamt. The headquarters of Himmler's intelligence services, the STAPO, SIPO, and SD
RVV	See Raad van Vertz
SAB	Student Assessment Board; reviewed qualifications of Jedburgh recruits
Sally	Cover name for joint SOE/SO command post exercise held 24 March 1944, in which the British acted as SOE staffs with the field armies and the Americans ran the control

SAS	Special Air Service, Britain's uniformed Special operations forces
SD	Sicherheitsdienst. Security Service. An organization of the Himmeler police force for the suppression of "internal resistance."
SF	Special Fund, normally established to provide finances necessary to maintain an agent's cover
SFHQ	Special Forces Headquarters. A joint SOE/OSS headquarters in SHAEF. Designated a branch of the G3, SHAEF, responsible for coordination of resistance groups
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
SIPO	Sicherheitspolizei. Himmeler's Security Police. Section IV of the SIPO was responsible for the liquidation of hostile agents. As services, SIPO and SD worked independently-but both of them were directed by the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Commander of SIPO and SD)
SO	Special Operations Branch of SOE
SOE	Special Operations Executive, the British secret intelligence and operations service
SOF	Special Operations Forces
S Phone	Small portable radio with a range of eight to ten miles that permitted communications with an aircraft an operator on the ground (weight: approximately ten pounds)
Spartan	Code name for General Headquarters exercise of a simulated invasion of the continent of western Europe in which agents and Jedburghs participated. Held between the Salisbury Plain and Huntington from 3 March to 11 March 1944.

Spur	Jedburgh exercise of an ambush of a German General Staff by partisans staged for General Koenig on 24 and 25 April 1944.
STAPO	Staatspolizei or Secret State Police, also known as the Gestapo.
Sten	A light, simple 9 millimeter machine carbine named after its inventor, British Major Sheppard Sten
Stoottrophen	Dutch resistance volunteers formed into conventional companies to support Allied operations. Responsible to Prince Bernhard's HQ
Stostrouppen	"shock troops," armed members of the resistance with some military training
STS	Special Training Schools of SOE
STS-40	Jedburgh training school at Gumley Hall, Lancashire, England
STS-45	Jedburgh training school at Fairford, Gloucester, England
STS-51	Parachute training school
STS-54	Training area
Triangle	The triumvirate of resistance groups, the RVV, the KP, and the OD, unified under the command of Prince Bernhard (BBS)
Vet	To identify and establish the credibility of an individual. To clear for information. Jedburghs "vetted" members of the resistance prior to employing them in support of the airborne divisions, for example
Wehrmacht	The German Army of World War II
W/T	Wireless telegraphy; radio

**Western
European
Directorate**

**The portion of SOE or SFHQ dealing with
operations in Western Europe**

**Western
European
Section**

**The sections of SO Branch dealing with
operations in Western Europe.**

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