

G(Int) Report on Operation 'MARKET'

This report is divided into three parts -

- 1) Personnel
- 2) Operation 'MARKET'
- 3) Report on Intelligence during the operation

The following appendices are added -

Intelligence Summaries Nos. - 4.

Report on German Troops in the ARNHEM area.

89 Para Field Security Section

1) Personnel

a) The disposition of the branch was as follows.

First Glider Lift

Major HP Maguire GSO 2 (I)
(Due to glider crash in England arrived in
fact with Second Glider Lift)

First Parachute Drop

Capt PAH Hodgson IO
Sjt Smith ES RASC

Second Glider Lift

Capt CP Scott-Malden GSO 3 (I)
Cpl Holden DWE RASC Clerk
Cpl Asterley JB RE Draughtsman
Sjt Smith G IC (att interrogator)

First Seaborne Lift

Lieut Hopkins APIS
Pte Rooke E RASC Clerk
L/Cpl Douglas R RE Draughtsman
L/Cpl Sykes RASC APIS
Dvr Taunton Pi Corps

Second Seaborne Lift

Capt K Spencer IO (ph)
Lieut R Millican APIS
Cpl Easton Midx)
Pte Wood ") MPIS
Pte Pearson ")
Dvr Farrow RASC)

Home Details

Pte Cunningham AM RASC Clerk

b) Branch casualties were as follows -

Major HP Maguire wounded ARNHEM 20 Sep, admitted RDS 21 Sep,
PW wef 25 Sep.

Capt CP Scott-Malden admitted to hospital in UK 29 Sep.

Cpl Holden DWE wounded ARNHEM 22 Sep, PW wef 25 Sep.

2) Operation 'MARKET'

Sun 17 Sep

For the first twenty-four hours of the operation, Capt Hodgson and Sjt Smith were the only representatives of the branch, as Major Maguire had crashed on take-off in England. As both were parachutists, it was possible to set up only the most rudimentary I office.

Six PW were taken and interrogated within an hour of landing in the WOLFHEZEN area 6680. It became immediately apparent that the enemy order of battle was going to be complex in the extreme owing to the diversity of units present. The immediate strength of German troops in the WOLFHEZEN area was stated to be some 200 men, which subsequently proved to be fairly accurate. By the evening of 17/18 Sep, some thirty PW had been collected. These were confined for the night in a glider on the LZ where Div HQ lageded.

Mon 18 Sep

Div HQ moved east down the main rd EEELSUM - ARNHEM and was joined by the Second Glider Lift in the afternoon, consisting as far as 'I' Branch was concerned of Major Maguire, Capt Scott-Malden, Cpl Holden and Cpl Asterley. The HQ was set up at 693784, the branch setting up a tented office outside the house under some trees. A PW cage was set up by the APM in the tennis courts, and the branch functioned normally for three days.

Wed 20 Sep

Major Maguire was hit in the back by the nose cap of an 88mm shell which burst in the trees. No limbs or bones appeared to be broken, but he was compelled to lie on his back. He was evacuated to the RAP, and subsequently to the MDS, and is thus assumed to be a PW wef 25 Sep.

Fri 22 Sep

Owing to consistent heavy shelling and mortaring, it was decided to disperse branches, and maintain a central command post in the cellar of the house. The G(Int) branch was accordingly closed and the personnel removed to slit trenches at the southern end of the race track 693781. Here it was impossible to open an office. PW interrogation continued under difficulties caused by shelling and mortaring. Summary No.4 was produced, but after this no more was written. Cpl Holden was wounded by mortar fire, evacuated, and is assumed PW wef 25 Sep.

Sat 23 Sep

The branch failed to function as such, since no intelligence information was received except captured documents, which were occasionally of interest, and only once of use. The personnel were employed in either avoiding mortar bombs or patrolling in an endeavour to watch the very open southern flank of the HQ perimeter.

Mon 25 Sep

Night 25/26
Sep

Operation 'BERLIN' was carried out according to plan, the branch suffering no casualties during the evacuation. Copies of all summaries produced during the operation, together with traces showing the layout of our own troops during various phases, were also brought away. The I trailer had to be abandoned after checking for secret documents.

/Wed 27 Sep

Wed 27 Sep The branch was in NIJMEGEN.

Thurs 28 Sep Move to LOUVAIN.

Fri 29 Sep Evacuation by air from BRUSSELS airfield. Capt
Scott-Malden admitted to hospital on landing in UK.

3) Report on Intelligence during Operation 'MARKET'

a) Two features of the operation militated against the efficient working of Intelligence to an increasing degree as the battle progressed. They were -

Lack of communications. The virtual breakdown of wireless communications meant the hamstringing of the swift passage of enemy information, and this largely destroyed its value in a battle which was on the doorstep of the Div HQ. The result was that although, under the circumstances, a not inconsiderable amount of information was available about the enemy, by the time it had been collated and possibly returned to forward units it was of purely historic interest.

The loss of trained I personnel. Experience has always shown that if the specialist or semi-specialist IO at unit HQ does not send back enemy information nobody else will. This was again shown to be true, and forward troops were far too busy fighting to disentangle the nicer points of enemy identification. In view of these drawbacks, a quite surprising amount of information did come back, mostly by personal visits of odd I personnel.

b) In tabulated form the chief sources of information fared as follows -

PW

These were fruitful sources of historic interest. The enemy intention was always plain, his strength was daily increasing, and interrogation merely served to confirm what was already known in most cases. In one case a tactical squeeze brought about the silencing of an SP gun, but that was the only case in which any information gained from PW produced any tangible tactical improvement in the local situation.

PW were tractable, ignorant, and as we expected to find them. Fuller details from interrogation appear in the 'Report on German Troops in the ARNHEM area' attached.

Handling of PW. In the initial stages, PW were being divested of all their documents and personal belongings. As had been foreseen, this frequently led to chaos during interrogation, and it was not until two or three days had elapsed that PW were left in possession of their effects. It cannot be too strongly stressed that officers are the only PW who should be divested of their documents and effects. OR PW should be searched only for ammunition and possible weapons. PW frequently arrived at the cage with no note of where or when they had been captured, and with very little idea themselves. This wasted a lot of time in sorting out details.

Co-operation with Pro at the cage for interrogation was very good, and the system worked smoothly.

Captured Documents.

The surprise gained in the initial landing rewarded I staffs with a large haul of documents. A number of these would have been of value to higher formation I staffs with a long term policy, but it was unfortunately impossible to evacuate them owing to their bulk. A few provided immediate identifications of units, and one a confirmation of a personality.

/Information from higher formations

Information from higher formations

Practically none was received, but one report that the SS Pz Div HOHENSTAUFEN was digging in on the IJSSEL was followed by the capture of a PW from a march coy of the engr bn of that division.

Civilians

Information from friendly civilians was generally found to be fairly reliable, after allowance had been made for the personality of the bearer, and after he had been vetted by the Dutch liaison party. The population was co-operative. Initially a large number of young men rallied to the cause, but disappeared in proportion as the shelling and mortaring grew. Several rendered excellent service, and the highest praise is due to those few who helped our wounded throughout and stayed with us to the last.

The Dutch liaison party

Commander VOLTERS and Lieut KNOTTENEELT and his Dutch commandos were first class. Their help was unfailingly efficient, and in very great measure. To them is due the great help received from the civilian population, and the averting of the many minor pitfalls into which an I staff might well have fallen when dealing with civilian suspects.

MARKET

SECRET

1 Airborne Division Intelligence Summary No.1 dated 19 Sep/44.

PART I

The confusion of the battle and the lack of communications has made it extremely difficult to form a clear picture so far, and what follows is largely a collection of bits and pieces.

First opposition to our landings came from artillery troops in the WOLFHEZEN 6679 area, fighting as infantry; they numbered about 200, and were mostly caught unarmed. 48 PW yielded 27 different identifications (see PART II), and it appears that WOLFHEZEN was a reporting centre for various arty units which were shot to bits in France. This area has now been cleared.

Other troops encountered in the same area came from the COEHOORN barracks in ARNHEM. This barracks seems, from conflicting reports, to have contained some 200 predominantly SS tps formed into some sort of bn, with a March Coy and a Recruit/Convalescent Coy. There is an extreme shortage of heavy weapons except Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust.

It is not clear whether these tps are the same as those from whom a number of PW have been taken today a little further North. These are stated to belong to 3 SS Pz Gr Trg Bn in ARNHEM, a unit with 5 Coys and about 500 men; it is at least possible, however, that this unit is to be equated with the last-mentioned.

Our own tps have reported resistance to our Eastward advance today in the area MARIENDAAL 7178 and DEN BRINK 7177, with MGs, 88's and 12 cm mortars. Dutch sources report that enemy resistance in the town is centred on the KIPPEN MARKT 746773, and that other strongpoints are at 748768, RIJNPAVILVOEN 728778, and along the line 765763 - 762769. The enemy is in some force at the North end of the main bridge, which is now reported in German hands, and he is reported to have got some half-dozen armoured and possibly tracked vehicles over the bridge into the town; the bridge is now blocked with enemy vehicles, and the whole South bank of the river is in German hands.

There is evidence that the Germans have been using at least one ferry staffed by Poles, to the West of ARNHEM (687767), where some well armed SS tps went South yesterday. Tanks and SP guns, with SS tps, are reported by Dutch sources at RENKUM 6276; this place, together with HEELSUM 6477, has been an SS forming and training area.

In the last ten days the Germans have impressed some 1400 civilians to work on a defence line of the R. IJSSEL; to bring their tps back to this line, assuming that the main road is blocked at NIJMEGEN, they must use the bridges and ferries to the West of us and then either go round to the North or try to fight their way through us Eastwards.

The German posns on MARIENDAAL and DEN BRINK are concerning at the moment since they dominate the bridges, the approaches to them and the low ground South of ARNHEM.

A report from one prisoner of a new "anaesthetic gas" is being further investigated.

(Sgd) HP Maguire

Time of Signature.
190200 A.

Major, GSO 2 (I),
1 Airborne Division.

PART II

Enemy Identifications.

Members of the following units were captured up to 180900A in the WOLFHEZEN 6680 area :-

<u>Unit.</u>	<u>Number of PW</u>
HKA 12250	3
AR 344	2
HAR 3750	1
Umschulungsbatterie Osnabrück	2
Marsch Btl zbV 511	1
Schiffstammabtirlung 10	2
AR 275	2
Ar 363	6(including 3 Russians)
SS Ers Btl HJ	1
Herresflak Abt 273	2
AR 346	3
HAR 11290	1
SS Aub und Ers btl 16	1
Marsch btl 33	1
Kriegsmarine	7(all Poles)
Kraftfahr 990	5
AR 762	1
AR 209	1
AR 342	1
Stambataillon Armee Waffenschule 15	1
AR 191	1
AR 713	1
Schw Ers Abt 62	1

Dumps.

Petrol dumps are reported at:-

734785
747778
761773

N.B.

1. All papers will be left on PW, except officers.
 2. A cine-camera containing much probably valuable film has been captured and has now disappeared; this must be returned at once to G(Int).
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PART I

1. General Situation.

In the early hours of this morning our relieving unit were making their way Eastwards along the Rhine towards the main bridge to which the elements of the original formation were still clinging. They had nearly reached it by daybreak, when however the enemy brought up some tanks, apparently across the bridge from South to North, and after some very heavy fighting with inadequate anti tank weapons these units had to fall back to the line of the railway. The number of tanks is not known - the reported total of 260 is obviously fantastic - nor is their type, though two Mk IVs have been definitely seen, and Tigers reported. Enemy pressure in this area has now eased.

Meanwhile our Northern unit, attacking towards the MARIENDAAL feature, encountered stiff opposition and was unable to secure the objective, and both this and the DEN BRINK feature to the South remain in enemy hands; it appears, however, that we still have a grip on the main bridge, which is intact though blocked by several smashed German staff cars; the garrison there is in good heart.

On our Western flank there has been sporadic fighting all day, but early reports of tanks and guns have not developed into anything much, and it appears we have here to deal only with cyclists and infantry who are not too keen to attack. The South bank of the Rhine does not appear to be held in any strength, and a civilian report says that the ARNHEM - NIJMEGEN road is practically clear of enemy as far South as LENT, where some armour is apparently waiting for our advance from the South.

2. Enemy Order of Battle.

The only clear features of the present enemy layout are as follows:-

- (a) Marsch coys from the WOLFHEZEN area, having been initially worsted, are being encountered on both East and West flanks of the Division.
- (b) 3 SS Wachbataillon, moved into action on foot from the AMERSFOORT area yesterday, has lost a quarter of its strength in PW alone, and has moved South to the Div West flank. Some elements may have slipped down into ARNHEM from the North.
- (c) 3 Coy 26 Sicherungs Regt, has been destroyed. The other seven coys are reported by PW to be moving South on bicycles from HILVERSUM area.
- (d) 316 Pz Gren Regt has been identified North of the railway in the area 6979.

3. Enemy Intentions.

It is impossible to appreciate enemy intentions without a full knowledge of the facts which we do not have. He must be concerned however with two things,

- (a) The destruction of 1 Airborne Division before the link up with the British armour so that he can hold the line of the Upper Rhine to give him more time to prepare defences on the ISSJEL.
- (b) Keeping open the ARNHEM bridge as a possible route of evacuation for his troops moving through NIJMEGEN (some armour has been reported between ELST and NIJMEGEN) this of course would explain his determined stand on the MARIENDAAL and DEN BRINK features, the possession of which commands the bridge and its approaches.

One thing we must expect is the infiltration of large numbers of snipers into the divisional built up areas during the night.

(Sgd) HP Maguire

Major G.2.(I).,
1 Airborne Division.

Time of Signature.....2215.....hrs.

PART II

Consolidated Interrogation Report.

From 191 prisoners taken up to 191645A, 42 separate units have been identified. This gives some indication of the present chaotic state of the German army.

Prisoners fall into two broad classes. The first remnants, chiefly of bombed or destroyed Arty units including GAF from the Western front which used WOLFHEZEN as a reforming centre, and were sent out as ill-equipped infantry owing to the lack of guns with which to refit them. These men are of low category, and include a high proportion of Volksdeutschen. The majority of them had been picked up by Straggler Collecting Unit, and had little infantry training.

The second category is the SS, chiefly from the SS Landsturm Nederland. This formation is the parent unit of several Wachbattallione and we have been in contact (to the extent of 106 PW) with the 3rd of them. It had five infantry coys of four platoons with Czech LMGs occupied with security duties (-4 Coy had been doing guard duty on the concentration camp at S'HERTOGENBOSEN). These were concentrated at AMERSFOORT, and marched into action from there. The personnel is largely Dutch by birth but also includes Volksdeutschen and even two Belgians pressed into service, one direct from prison at UTRECHT.

Oddments in the cage comprise the first Japanese prisoner to be taken by the Division - a civilian; a German WAAF; a Dutch gentleman of the road whose abode has now been fixed for security reasons; several Polish ferrymen and a Swiss.

Morale as usual with PW is low. Most agree that the war is lost, virtually none is truculent and most are cooperative. Their present attitude is however, not a reflection of their recent standard of fighting - particularly with the SS.

Reference Summary No.1, no further information is yet forthcoming about the 'Anaesthetic' (Betäubungs) gas.

Major General Kussin (?). Four corpses found riddled in a staff car at cross roads 679785 on the 18th proved to be Major General Kussin(?), his batman, driver and interpreter, all from the Feldkommandantur in ARNHEM.

At Appendix 'A' is a list of PW by units. This will perhaps explain why it has been impossible to present intelligent picture of enemy strength and locations.

APPENDIX 'A' to
1 ABD Int Sum No.2.

PW taken up to 191645A hrs include identifications as follows:-

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>No of PW</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>No. of PW</u>
A.R. 344	1	L.S.Abt g 17	1
Arty A 6	1	A.O.K.St Bn 15	2
A.R. 347	1	GAF 17	2
A.R. 346	2	5/131 A.R.	1
A.R. 191	1	2/1252 A.R.	4
A.R. 363	11	Trans Abtg 990	4
A.R. 146	2	K.A.352	1
A.R. 762	1	5/131	1
Arty A 1255	4	1/1192	1
Arty A 555	1	F.P.N. 13160	1
A Ers A 28	1	Lazarett Arnheim	1
A.R. 352	1	Trans Abt 14	1
Arty R 147	1	Trans.Abt 990	1
A Res A 70	1	Krankenabtg 686	1
A.R. 275	3	K.W.Inst P.522	1
A Ers A 5	1	Flak Abtg 273	2
Arty A 713	1	Sich Regt 26	1
Arty A 273	1	Führ Ausb St.1	2
Arty A 511	1	SS Wach Bn 3	106
Arty A 507	1	Umsch Batt Osnabrück	1
10 S.St.A	2		
14 S.St.A	15		
	<u>54</u>		<u>135</u>

Grand Total ; 189.

Also 1 Officer
4 Civilians
1 Female.

1 Airborne Division Intelligence Summary No.3 of 21 Sep 1944.

1. General Situation

Apart from intermittent shelling from one gun, the night 19/20 was quiet; a small party of enemy infiltrated along the main road from ARNHEM but were neutralised. Soon after first light the tempo quickened, and tanks and infantry attacked on our Western flank; they were held, but soon after a concentration of SS was observed North of the railway about 7079; in due course they attacked and made considerable headway, but at the cost of heavy casualties. The situation on the Northern flank was finally restored when one of our sub-units which had been North of the railway all night attacked SE and broke through into our main position inflicting very heavy casualties on the enemy. Meanwhile an attack had come in along the main road from ARNHEM which made considerable progress and overrun the MDS, but then petered out; it was made by 90 men of an Engr Coy supported by two SP 7.5 or 8.8 cm guns - information volunteered immediately by a very frightened PW who thought he was going to be shot out of hand.

Soon after lunch the flak opened up in force at our supply aircraft and for one reason and another a large proportion of the first resupply failed to fall within the Divisional area. However at 1715 hours another first class resupply drop was made the bulk of which landed in the right place. Flak on both occasions was very heavy.

All this time our unit on the main bridge, though hard pressed, was holding out and in good heart, with the bridge intact and covered by our fire. They reported by 1800 hrs the death of 400 Germans and the capture of 140, together with the destruction of 6 tks (2 Mk IVs), 6 armoured carriers and an armd car.

Sporadic fighting continued on the main divisional perimeter, with infiltration and patrolling activity by both sides. Towards evening the enemy put down considerable mortar fire on our Western position, but this was countered by our arty, and through the night there was only slight activity: the only change in the position was that yesterday evening our second unit from the NW forced its way through into the main perimeter.

2. Enemy Intention.

With the advance of our armour continuing across the intact NIJMEGEN bridge, it is to be expected that the enemy will draw in his force on to the ARNHEM flank in order to be able to disengage them as our bridgehead is reinforced; meanwhile he is likely to shoot off his available mortar and heavy ammunition in our direction, a process which at the moment appears to be in full swing.

Time of Signature 0900 hrs

(Sgd) C.P. Scott-Malden Capt.
for Major, GSO 2(I).,
1 Airborne Division.

STOP PRESS

One unit has just reported the capture in running order of a Mk III tank.

Interrogation Reports.
March Coy of SS Pz Pi Btl HOHENSTAUFEN.

One PW, captured on main road 7078 approx 1000hrs, the only one one yet taken from this unit, is a typical Nazi, and is now cooperative. He gave the following information of immediate tactical value.

His unit had come immediately from LOUVAIN where it had been hastily formed. It consisted of two pls of two secs each of approx 25 men. The armement of each sec was 1 LMG and the remainder of the weapons were rifles, machine pistols and pistols. It was operating from East to West, with a pl each side of the main road. Fire support was provided by two 75 mm SP guns, on what PW believed to be Mark IV chassis, but was not sure. They were in action on either side of main road 800 yds to the rear of fwd tps.

This is the first PW to be received at Div HQ direct from having been in action, and having had no time to think. His response to a firm tactical squeeze was immediate and productive, having resulted in the destruction of at least one, possibly both SP guns.

Pz Gren Regt 63.

Identifications of PW captured in the area 'Spoilterrein' 6879 showed the presence of at least two coys of Pz Gren Regt 63. PW were of 1 and 7 Coys. Information revealed that in addition to those two coys other units of this bn were present.

The coys were of normal strength, formed in ARNHEM, and marched round the town to the NE and were put into action immediately.

Each coy was organised of 3 pls of 4 secs with 1 LMG each. Owing to their speedy formation no confirmed knowledge of the other units in this regt could be obtained but an NCO believed that each bn had a mortar pl consisting of 4 secs with 50 mm mortars?. 2 50 mm SP Pak were seen and some SP 2 cm on caterpillars. Most of the personnel arrived from WUPPERTAL two days ago.

1 Airborne Division Intelligence Summary No.4 dated 22 Sep 1944.

PART I

1. General Situation.

During the morning of 21 Sep an attack came from the North which made some headway, but the situation was soon restored. In the afternoon the enemy's main effort was from the East and directed SW towards the HEVEADORP ferry, and some progress was made on the bank of the river where some enemy are still ensconced. An SP gun was used in this attack, and has been troublesome today in this area but it has now been liquidated.

The night 21/22 was quiet, and enemy infiltration was not on the scale expected; there are, however, numerous snipers in the divisional area, many of which have been accounted for. The marked reduction in enemy activity from the evening of Sep 21 is probably attributable to the additional arty support which became available in the afternoon; it is evident that the Germans were severely shaken by our heavier shells, and some parties have been offering to surrender to single jeeps.

To-day as well the enemy has shown little inclination to attack; a few tanks have caused a little trouble to the East and SE, and a small attack with SP guns came in on the SW at about 1930 hrs; the usual snipers have been active, but otherwise the low standard of the troops opposed to us is beginning to tell. One PW brought in today attributed his capture to the fact that he had forgotten his rifle, and said that his Landsturm unit of old men and crocks had been put in to stiffen up the SS. Mortaring, on the other hand, has been if anything more troublesome than yesterday, and it appears that the enemy now disposes of a few artillery pieces of 10.5cm or 15cm calibre; these too, however, have not been neglected by our own counter-battery fire.

2. Enemy Intentions.

PW statements yesterday indicated that they intended to continue to attack from the West until they achieved a breakthrough, which was expected by the evening. Their expectations not being realised, they have been far less determined to-day, and it appears that the intention now is rather to pound us into submission by weight of explosive. Neither method is being successful, but it is likely that the second will be followed from now on rather than the first; the troops at the enemy's disposal are not of a calibre to stand up too well to the punishment they have been getting from both arty and small arms.

Time of Signature

(Sgd) C.P. Scott-Malden, Capt.,
for Major, GSO 2(I).,
1 Airborne Division.

FOOTNOTE.

The identity of Major General KUSSIN and his appointment as Feldkommandant of ARNHEM, mentioned in Summary No.1 have now been confirmed by his signature on a court of inquiry report on the death of a sentry killed by a train on NIJMEGEN Bridge.

PART II

1. Enemy Methods.

(a) A "propaganda van" has been touring some of our units with the usual stories that the division was surrounded and a German Panzer Division was just about to attack. The troops were exhorted to think of their wives and children and surrender while there was still time. The smooth-voiced gentleman with the loudspeaker was chased off with a PIAT.

(b) One unit has reported some "mock surrender" parties. The chief technique appears to be for half a dozen troops to come forward with their hands up, and at the last moment fall flat to allow an MG behind to open up on the British party receiving the surrender.

(c) One of our officers walked into the dressing station to have an arm wound dressed when the station was in enemy hands; the operation performed he brushed aside the sentry's suggestion that he was now a PW, walked out and returned to duty.

(d) Earlier on, an SP gun put two shells through the same MDS; the surgeon on duty ran out with a Red Cross flag and protested in colourful language, and the gun commander said "Oh! sorry" and went away.

2. Enemy Identifications.

The following new units have been identified since last summary; for details see the interrogation report below.

155 Mixed Flak Abt (by doc)
2 / Sich Btl 908 (by PW)
SS Unterführerschule 34 (by PW)
Pz Gren Ers Btl 361 (by PW)

3. PW.

Total at 221600A	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>Ors</u>	<u>Civilians</u>
		<u>Male</u>	<u>Female.</u>
	2	201	1

4. Enemy Vehicle Casualties.

Owing to communication difficulties and other reasons, not all vehicle casualties are reported; the following are known and confirmed.

Tanks - 6
Armoured Carriers - 6
Armoured Cars - 1
SP Guns - 2
Ammunition Lorries - 2

Loudspeaker van - 1 damaged
Personnel Lorries
(with personnel) 1

Interrogation Report.

The present tendency seems to be to plug holes in the files of the SS with any occupational troops who have been rushed up. One such stop-gap unit has been:-

908 Sicherungs Bn.

This unit, identified by one PW on the East of the div sector, was originally stationed in the LILLE-HAZEBROUK area performing security duties. PW, who was aged about 45, military correct, friendly, affable and dirty, volunteered the following information. His coy consists of about 120 men, organised in four platoons, armed only with rifles. It has been in action with SS tps since Monday when it left ARNHEM. PW believes there is a No. 1 coy and also 3 and 4 coys are engaged. The general age of men in the unit is 40 - 50 years.

Report on German Troops in the ARNHEM area 17 - 23 Sep 44.

1. General

The chief difficulty in assessing enemy order of battle arose from the lack of communications experienced by 1 Airborne Div, particularly in the later stages, when all touch was lost with 1 Para Bde. This meant that practically no identifications were passed back, and the general picture had to be gleaned from interrogation of PW, which was carried out at times under extreme difficulty owing to persistent shelling. Any accurate assessment of the enemy strength opposing the division at the time of withdrawal is out of the question. The main trend was as follows.

2. Homogeneous Units.

No battle group were identified by name. The largest unit identified was of bn strength. Below is a list of all the tps fighting as formed bodies identified as such.

3SS Wachbataillon.

This unit was first encountered on 18 Sep on the West flank of the division. Its parent unit was SS Landsturm Nederland. 106 PW were taken from the Bn, which was organized in five infantry coys of four pls of three secs armed with Czech LMG. It had been engaged in security duties at various points in the AMERSFOORT area - 4 coy had for a time performed guard duties on the concentration camp at S'HERTOGENBOSCH. The bn was concentrated at AMERSFOORT on 17 Sep, and marched into action from there. Personnel were about 60 - 70 Dutch volunteers, but also included two Belgians, released from prison a few days previously for drafting purposes. The rest were Volksdeutschen. All personnel had had a few months infantry training. Total strength approx 500 men.

3SS Pz Trg Bn

Stationed in the COEHOORN KASERNE in ARNHEM, providing inf trg for three months. NCOs came from the Unterführerschule in ARNHEM. Organized into five coys of about 120 men each, armed with LMG varying from one to three in number in each pl. Personnel was mainly German, with a fair number of Dutch volunteers. The Bn was engaged on the Eastern flank of the div within a day of landing.

March Coy of SS Pz Pi Btl HOHENSTAUFEN.

Only one PW was taken from this unit on 22 Sep. He gave the following infm. His unit had come direct from LOUVAIN, where it had originally been formed. It consisted of two pls of two secs each of approx 25 men. The armament of each sec was 1 LMG, rifles, machine pistols, and pistols. The coy had been quartered in ARNHEM, but only for a brief period, so PW was unable to give its location. (Note: Immediately prior to the capture of this PW, a message from Dutch sources had suggested that SS Pz Div HOHENSTAUFEN was digging in on the IJSSEL).

3 Coy 26 Sicherungs Regt.

This coy was destroyed on the div WEST flank on 19 Sep. 26 Sich Regt was stated by PW to contain seven coys, each of unknown armament. It was reported by the same PW that the other six coys were moving on 19 Sep by bicycle from the HILVERSUM to ARNHEM area, but none of them had been identified up to 25 Sep.

Pz Gren Regt 63.

At least two coys of this Regt were identified north of the div. PW were taken from 1 & 7 coys. Other coys were stated to be engaged, but were not identified. 1 & 7 coys were organized into three pls of 4 secs, with 1 LMG per sec. Owing to their speedy formation no confirmed knowledge of the other units in this regt could be obtained, but a NCO believed that each bn had a mortar pl consisting of 4 secs with 50 mm mortars. Most of the personnel arrived direct from WUPPERTAL where they were undergoing primary training.

903 Sich Bn.

PW from this unit gave the following infm. The bn was originally in the LILLE - HAZEBROUK area, performing security duties. It consisted of (1) 2,3 and 4 coys. No 2 coy consisted of about 120 men,organised in four pls of four secs armed with rifles. PW believed that there was a No 1 coy. The general age of personnel was 40 - 50 years,and the standard of inf trg was low. No.2 coy had been split up amongst SS tps.

10 & 14 Schiffstammteilungen

Two PW were taken from 10 S.Sta A.,and 15 from 14. Unfortunately the interrogation reports have been destroyed,so full details cannot be given. The units provided guards for ferries on the lower Rhine,but had been engaged as inf.

3. Ad hoc bodies.

The WOLFHEZEN area 6679 was used as a reforming and bivouac area for arty and a few GAF(flak)tps - about 200 in number. The tps concerned were practically without exception from regts and units destroyed in France. Most PW believed that they were to be reformed as inf march bns. A few 105mm guns were overrun by 1 Para Bde,but there was no amm for them,and it seems unlikely that the Germans intention was to re-equip them as gunners. The morale of these tps was low,and by weapons were lacking. Out of 48 PW taken on D - D+1, 27 different units were identified. As none of the several march coys identified had been formed for more than three days it was impossible to make any assessment of total strengths. As an indication of the general chaos prevailing,the following list of PW held at 191645 is given:-

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No.of PW.</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>No of PW</u>
AR 3441	1	10 S.St.A	2
AR 347	1	14 S.St.A	15
AR 346	2	A.Erz A.28	1
AR 191	1	Umsch Batt Osnabrück	1
AR 363	11	Fuhr Ausb,St	1
AR 762	1	Sich Regt 26	1
AR 146	2	Krankenabt 686	1
AR 147	1	" 352	1
AR 275	3	Transport Abt 990	1
AR 352	1	" " 14	1
AR 70	1	KW Inst P 522	1
AR 713	1	SS Wach Bn 3	106
AR 273	1	Lazeret ARNHEM	1
Arty Abt 1255	4	Arty Ers A 5	1
" " 555	1	" " A 6	1
" " 507	1	L.S.Abt 17	1
" " 511	1	A.O.K.St Bn 15	2
5/131 Arty Abt	2	1/1192 Arty Abt	1
2/1252 " "	4	FP.N. 13160	1
Flak Abt 273	2		
17 GAF Div	2	<u>GRAND TOTAL 188</u>	

4. Support Weapons.

Although several SP guns and tks were knocked out, no identifications were obtained. Known and confirmed enemy veh casualties were as follows up to 22 Sep. After this date a check was impossible.

Tanks	6
Armd Tp Carriers	6
Armd Cars	1
SP guns	2
Amn lorries	2
Personnel lorries	1 (full)
Loudspeaker van	1 (damaged)

5. Propaganda

On 22 Sep the forward units of the division were visited by a loud-speaker van which threatened them with an attack by a German Armd Div, and exhorted them to think of their wives, sweethearts, etc. and surrender. It then played dance music, and was forced to withdraw in some confusion after an attack by 21 Indep Para Coy with a PIAT.

6. Tactics.

(a) The low standard of the infantry, despite their eventual superiority in numbers, forced the enemy to rely chiefly on his support weapons, and casualties from SP gun fire and mortars were very high, particularly in wooded areas initially before our men had dug in. There was a morning and evening hate on div HQ which became more and more intensive, and at times continuous, as more weapons were engaged. The following were identified: Mortars of varying calibres.

105 mm gun hows
150 mm hcws
88 mm flak (HE and air bursts)
Rockets (a few of unidentified calibre)

The use of all heavy weapons was as laid down in the text books. Mortar fire in particular was accurate and rapidly forthcoming. SP Flamethrowers were reported but details are lacking.

(b) A few "mock surrender" parties were encountered among SS troops. The technique was for the Germans to fall flat on their faces, to permit a heavy MG to open fire on the British party receiving the surrender.

(c) The observance of the red cross was very good by the Germans except for their snipers. An SP gun commander apologised for having put two shells into the MDS in error. It was overrun by the Germans but men who got away later report that our men were being well looked after.

(d) Snipers were numerous and inaccurate. No night attacks were attempted but snipers infiltrated at night, and one in particular existed for three days in the centre of the Div area without being spotted, although his approximate location was configured by observation and experience to a group of three trees.

7. PH.

In general POW gave information freely. Only one case was found of a refusal, by an SS private, but this was soon quelled by a theatrical demonstration.

Three officers were captured,--a security minded oblt from 3SS Wach bn, who had been a waiter in civil life, and was aged about 47, an oblt from 908 Sicherungs Bn, aged about 47 who spoke freely within the very limited confines of his knowledge, and a third SS officer who was evacuated to hospital before he could be interrogated.

As for OR - The SS gave info freely as did the Wehrmacht.

A high proportion of Volksdeutschen and Dutch was encountered. Curiosities included a Pole aged 65, a Japanese, and a German WAAF from ARNHEM. Casualties inflicted on POW after capture by German shelling and mortaring totalled about seven killed and a score wounded. Morale of most POW was fair and increased as the battle progressed. One noticeable feature was that when all POW who eventually totalled about 200, were fallen in for roll-call by their own NCOs the SS and Wehrmacht automatically fell in as separate bodies.

8. Conclusion.

(a) Order of Battle. This was confused in the extreme. March coys and ad hoc units are being formed out of army remnants, and the only units of bn size were SS.

b) Enemy Strength. Impossible to assess, partly due to no estimate of German killed being available, chiefly due to the fact that no march coys had been formed for more than a few days.

c) Fighting Value. Of the Infantry, poor. The SS were very noticeable better than the Army. Not one night attack was made although machine gun demonstrations by night were frequent.

d). Method of Reinforcement. All available troops were rushed from the West of HOLLAND and GERMANY to reinforce the threatened area. Transport was chiefly by road from GERMANY, by bicycles in HOLLAND.

Field.
BLA
27 Sep 44
PH/PBS

(Sgd) P.A.H. Hodgson,
Captain & I.O.,
1 Brit Airborne Division.

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OPERATION 'MARKET'

89 (Para) F.S. Section.

1. PERSONNEL.

1st Para Drop.

Capt. J.E. Killick) with Div. HQ
Sjt. Chambers) Gp.

Sjt. Pinguet)
Cpl. Gray)
Cpl. Linden) 1 Para Bde
Cpl. Maybury) Sub Sec.
Cpl. Gately)

1st Glider Lift.

Sjt. Ramage)
Cpl. Foster) 1 A/L Bde

CSM Armstrong) Div HQ Gp.

2nd Para Drop.

Sjt. Syme)
Cpl. Hanet) 4 Para Bde
Cpl. Gorrie) Sub Sec.
Cpl. Zitman)

2nd Glider Lift.

Cpl. Smyth
Cpl. Scarr

1st Seaborne Party.

Cpl. Edwards
Cpl. Zucker
L/Cpl. Eley (Driver-Batman)

Casualties.

Died. Cpl. Scarr 27 Sep 44.

Missing
Sjt. Chambers
Sjt. Syme
Cpl. Linden
Cpl. Maybury
Cpl. Gately
Cpl. Smyth

PW Capt. J.E. Killick
Cpl. Gray

Wounded PW
Sjt. Pinguet
Cpl. Foster
Cpl. Zitman

Wounded
CSM Armstrong
Cpl. Hanet
Cpl. Gorrie

2. OPERATION MARKET.

17 Sep.

1st Bde sub.sec.moved into ARNHEM according to plan. Capt.Killick joined them in the evening from Div.HQ. Sjt Chambers having moved off directly upon landing.

18th Sep.

CSM Armstrong at Div.HQ with Sjt.Ramage and Cpl.Foster from 1 A/L Bde.joined later in the evening by the 2nd lift. Sjt.Syme, Cpls.Gorrie, Hanet, Scarr, Smyth and Zitman. As no news had been heard from FSO and as the situation in the town was still confused, it was decided to remain concentrated at Div.HQ.

19th Sep.

House searches carried out on information from local resistance in collaboration with Dutch liaison party. No casualties were sustained. Capt.Killick was in civil telephone communication with Lt.KNOTTENBELT.

20th Sep.

Cpls.Foster, Hanet and Scarr wounded by shrapnel from mortaring. Cpl.Foster sustained a compound fracture of the arm, was evacuated to MDS and is assumed PW w.e.f.25 Sep.

21st Sep.

Slight patrolling activity by members of Section. Cpl. Zitman shot a sniper.

22nd Sep.

Cpls.Gorrie and Zitman wounded by shrapnel. Cpl. Zitman evacuated to MDS and assumed PW w.e.f.25 Sep.

23rd Sep.

CSM Armstrong wounded by shrapnel. Sjt.Syme, Sjt. Ramage and Cpl.Smyth carried out night patrols on southern part of the perimeter.

25th Sep.

Night 25/26. Operation Berlin. CSM Armstrong, Sjt. Ramage, Cpl. Hanet, Cpl. Gorrie and Cpl. Scarr successfully evacuated.

26th Sep.

Arrived at NIJMEGEN

27th Sep.

Cpl.Scarr died.

28th Sep.

Move to LOUVAIN

29th Sep.

Evacuated by air from BRUSSELS airfield.
CSM Armstrong and Cpl.Hanet evacuated to hospital on landing in UK.

3. THE IB/CI PLAN.

The plan of the section was to concentrate in ARNHEM as soon as the situation was under control, and set about the large list of Ib targets. The progress of the operation rendered this impossible, and it was decided to keep the 4th Para and 1st A/L sub sees concentrated at Div HQ rather than waste trained personnel by putting them into a fluid battle where it would have been impossible for them to operate.

The work of the section outside the town was therefore confined to: a) House Searches, b) Document sorting, c) Snap checks.

a) House Searches.

These were undertaken on locally volunteered information after it had been checked by the Dutch liaison party. In practically all cases all incriminating documents had been destroyed and the owner had fled.

b) Document sorting.

A large number of documents was gone through, but as it was found impossible to evacuate any, the labour entailed was unfortunately wasted.

c) Snap checks.

Snap checks were carried on inside the Div HQ perimeter in conjunction with the Dutch mission.

No news was received from the bridge party under Capt. Killick after the phone message of 19th Sep. At that time fighting was in progress, and no Ib work could be undertaken.

During the latter days of the action, no Ib work at all was performed. Members of the section helped in patrolling, and Cpl. Zitman distinguished himself throughout, helping to put out fires under trying circumstances, bagging a sniper, carrying wounded and keeping up morale until he himself was hit in the foot and evacuated.